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Secular and Ecclesiastical Justice
in Late Anglo-Saxon England
By N i c o l e M a r a ﬁ o t i

In the early eleventh century, the homilist and legislator Wulfstan, archbishop of
York (r. 1002–23), sought to explain the historical relationship between royal
power and ecclesiastical justice in England.1 He did so by celebrating the legal policies of earlier kings:
Hig gesetton woruldlice steora . . . for ðam þingum þe hig wistan, þæt hig elles ne mihton
manegum gesteoran, ne fela manna nolde to godcundre bote elles gebugan, swa hy sceolde;
⁊ þa woruldbot hig gesetton gemæne Criste ⁊ cynge, swa hwar swa man nolde godcunde
bote gebugan mid rihte to bisceopa dihte.
[They established earthly punishments because they knew that they would be unable to
control many people otherwise; and otherwise, many people would not wish to submit to
penance as they should. And they established earthly compensation to be split between
Christ and the king, wherever a person would not rightly submit to penance according to
the bishops’ decree.2]

This passage identiﬁes two objectives behind judicial punishment: to control the
population and enable lawbreakers to repent of their sins. When royal power was deployed correctly, according to Wulfstan’s logic, offenders would face consequences
in both the secular and the religious spheres. First, a convicted perpetrator would be
This article was written with support from Trinity University and completed during a residency at
the National Humanities Center, funded by an ACLS Burkhardt Fellowship. I am grateful to Jay Paul
Gates and Charles West for their insightful comments on early drafts, as well as to Kristen Carella,
Zsuzsanna Gulacsi, Andrew Rabin, Cynthia Talbot, Nancy Wicker, and the anonymous Speculum reviewers for their generous advice.
1
For Wulfstan’s career and inﬂuence, see especially Dorothy Whitelock, “Archbishop Wulfstan, Homilist and Statesman,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th ser., 24 (1942): 25–45; Patrick
Wormald, “Wulfstan (d. 1023),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004), http://
www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/30098 (last accessed 31 October 2017); Patrick Wormald, “Archbishop
Wulfstan and the Holiness of Society,” in Legal Culture in the Early Medieval West: Law as Text, Image,
and Experience (London, 1999), 225–51; Wormald, The Making of English Law: King Alfred to the
Twelfth Century, vol. 1, Legislation and Its Limits (Oxford, 1999), 449–65; Andrew Rabin, ed., The Political Writings of Archbishop Wulfstan of York (Manchester, 2015), 1–44; and the essays in Matthew
Townend, ed., Wulfstan, Archbishop of York: Proceedings of the Second Alcuin Conference, Studies in
the Early Middle Ages 10 (Turnhout, 2004).
2
All Old English and Latin translations are my own, unless otherwise noted. This document is conventionally known as The Peace of Edward and Guthrum, and the quotation is taken from the second
clause of the prologue; the Old English is edited by Felix Liebermann, Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen,
3 vols. (Halle, 1903), 1:129–31. Although it purports to be a treaty of the early tenth century, Edward
and Guthrum was composed by Wulfstan, likely between 1002 and 1008: Dorothy Whitelock, “Wulfstan and the So-Called Laws of Edward and Guthrum,” English Historical Review 56 (1941): 1–21;
Wormald, Making of English Law, 389–91; Jay Paul Gates, “Preaching, Politics, and Episcopal Reform in Wulfstan’s Early Writings,” Early Medieval Europe 23 (2015): 93–116, at 109–10.
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Secular and Ecclesiastical Justice in Late Anglo-Saxon England 775
liable for “earthly punishments” (woruldlice steora) for his breach of peace or violation of royal law. Second, he would have to undertake penance for his sins—literally, “spiritual compensation” (godcunde bote)—according to episcopal instruction; if he refused, further “earthly compensation” (woruldbot) would be exacted
on Christ’s behalf for breaking the rules of the earthly church. This schema takes
for granted that two types of justice would be deployed in tandem. Secular authorities would judge an offender for his temporal violation and determine the appropriate punishment or compensation, while ecclesiastical authorities would judge an offender for his sin and determine the appropriate penance. Even though royal power
might be used to enforce secular and spiritual law simultaneously, this passage assumes that separate judgments would be issued by lay and religious authorities, each
operating within their own jurisdiction.
Wulfstan’s understanding of secular and ecclesiastical justice is noteworthy because there is scarce evidence of a division between these systems in the AngloSaxon period. Traditional wisdom long held that “there was no sort of distinction
between the lay and the ecclesiastical jurisdiction” before the 1066 Norman Conquest.3 Instead, their separation has been conventionally dated to the reign of William the Conqueror (r. 1066–87), who was purportedly distressed by the fact that
English bishops were rendering ecclesiastical judgments in secular courts. To remedy this situation, William decreed:
Nullus episcopus vel archidiaconus de legibus episcopalibus amplius in hundret placita
teneant, nec causam que ad regimen animarum pertinet ad iudicium secularium hominum
adducant. Sed quicunque secundum episcopales leges de quacumque causa vel culpa
interpellatus fuerit ad locum quem ad hoc episcopus elegerit et nominaverit veniat, ibique
de causa vel culpa sua respondeat, et non secundum hundret, sed secundum canones et
episcopales leges rectum Deo et episcopo suo faciat. . . . Hoc etiam defendo et mea
auctoritate interdico, ne ullus vicecomes aut prepositus seu minister regis, nec aliquis laicus
homo de legibus que ad episcopum pertinet se intromittat.
[No bishop or archdeacon shall henceforth hold pleas relating to episcopal laws in the
[secular] hundred court, nor shall they bring to the judgment of laymen any matter
which concerns the rule of souls. But anyone cited under the episcopal laws shall come
to the place which the bishop shall choose, and there he shall plead his case, or answer
for his offense. He shall not be tried according to the law of the hundred court, but he
shall submit to the justice of God and his bishop in accordance with the canons and the
episcopal laws. . . . I also forbid any sheriff or reeve or ofﬁcial of the king or any layman
to interfere with the laws which pertain to the bishop.4]

Certainly, the separation of secular and ecclesiastical courts became increasingly
pronounced on both sides of the Channel during William’s reign.5 The 1080 Coun3
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols. (Oxford, 1765–69; repr. Buffalo, 1992), 3:61.
4
The text is edited (with discussion of dating) by David Bates, Regesta regum Anglo-Normannorum:
The Acta of William I (1066–1087) (Oxford, 1998), 140–42, no. 128; the translation is adapted from
David C. Douglas and George W. Greenaway, English Historical Documents, vol. 2, 1042–1189, 2nd
ed. (London, 1981), 647–48, no. 79. The writ is undated but likely originated in the 1070s or 1080s.
5
This initiative has been attributed to Archbishop Lanfranc of Canterbury (r. 1070–89), whose efforts helped lay the groundwork for an autonomous system of episcopal justice in England after the
Conquest: William Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England in Its Origin and Development,
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776 Secular and Ecclesiastical Justice in Late Anglo-Saxon England
cil of Lillebonne, for example, afﬁrmed the distinction between these two brands of
justice, even as it proclaimed the king’s ultimate authority over both.6 Despite Norman authorities’ reforming rhetoric, however, recent scholarship on English legal
culture has revealed a more gradual process of adaptation across the eleventh century, with Anglo-Saxon judicial and administrative frameworks providing vital
support for post-Conquest initiatives.7 The fact that Wulfstan differentiated between secular and religious justice in the early 1000s indicates that William’s division of English courts was not as novel as it purported to be.
Nevertheless, scholars continue to view William’s reign as a turning point for
jurisdictional divisions, and indeed, when read backward from the Norman and
Angevin periods, Anglo-Saxon royal law appears to make very little distinction between religious and secular justice.8 Criminal and sinful offenses were frequently addressed together in legislation of the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, and this
has been taken to mean that the two were conﬂated—in the minds of lawmakers, at
least—into a broad category of “wrong.”9 Still, there is little dispute that the responsibility to reconcile sinners fell ultimately to the clergy, rather than to secular
magnates, since ecclesiastical jurisdiction over sin and its remedies is attested by a
range of Anglo-Saxon penitential literature and religious regulations.10 Yet this material is rarely regarded as evidence for a cohesive system of ecclesiastical justice.
On the Continent, religious authorities showed increasing concern with jurisprudence across the tenth and eleventh centuries, delineating ecclesiastical jurisdictions

3 vols., 6th ed. (Oxford, 1874‒78), 1:307–9; Frank Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, 3rd ed. (Oxford,
1971), 669–70; H. E. J. Cowdrey, Lanfranc: Scholar, Monk, and Archbishop (Oxford, 2003), 132–34;
Edwin Maxey, “The Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction in England,” Michigan Law Review 3 (1905): 360–64,
at 360–61; Colin Morris, “William I and the Church Courts,” English Historical Review 82 (1967):
449–63; F. Donald Logan, Excommunication and the Secular Arm in Medieval England: A Study in
Legal Procedure from the Thirteenth to the Sixteenth Century (Toronto, 1968), 17–20.
6
The canons of the Council of Lillebonne are recorded by Orderic Vitalis, The Ecclesiastical History
5.5, ed. Marjorie Chibnall, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1972), 3:24–37. See also Charles Homer Haskins, Norman Institutions (Cambridge, MA, 1918), 30–39; Raymonde Foreville, “The Synod of the Province
of Rouen in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,” in Church and Government in the Middle Ages: Essays Presented to C. R. Cheney on his 70th Birthday, ed. C. N. L. Brooke, D. E. Luscombe, G. H. Martin, and Dorothy Owen (Cambridge, UK, 1976), 19–39, at 26–27; David C. Douglas, William the
Conqueror (Berkeley, 1964), 331–36; Pierre Chaplais, “Henry II’s Reissue of the Canons of the Council of Lillebonne of Whitsun 1080 (?25 February 1162),” Journal of the Society of Archivists 4 (1973):
627–32; Morris, “William I and the Church Courts,” 451–53; Cowdrey, Lanfranc, 132.
7
See especially Richard Helmholz, Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol. 1, Canon Law and
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction from 597 to the 1640s (Oxford, 2004), 61–62, 108–11.
8
Frank Barlow is a notable exception to this scholarly tendency, for his nuanced discussion of secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions in eleventh-century England illuminates the various ways in which
these spheres were distinguished: see The English Church 1000–1066, 2nd ed. (London, 1979), 137–
53, 232–76, with an evaluation of William’s writ at 275–76. More recently, the differentiation of secular and ecclesiastical law in eighth-century Northumbria has been examined by Bryan Carella, “The
Earliest Expression for Outlawry in Anglo-Saxon Law,” Traditio 70 (2015): 111–43.
9
Paul R. Hyams, “Does It Matter When the English Began to Distinguish Crime and Tort?,” in Violence in Medieval Society, ed. R. Kaeuper (Woodbridge, UK, 2000), 107–28, at 109–10; Helmholz,
Oxford History of the Laws of England, 1:35–37.
10
The sources for canonical collections, penitentials, and ecclesiastical law in Anglo-Saxon England
are surveyed in Helmholz, Oxford History of the Laws of England, 1:27–40.
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and establishing norms for administering episcopal justice. This trend has not been
identiﬁed in England during this period, however, presumably because pre-Conquest
royal law seems to integrate ecclesiastical and secular interests so closely.11
Accordingly, while processes of spiritual reconciliation have been well examined in the context of English religious ritual or high-level political activity, scholars have rarely approached them as judicial procedures in their own right.12 Where
Continental bishops employed ecclesiastical law and justice to proclaim their authority in the face of encroaching secular power, their English counterparts are
known for their collaboration with laymen.13 Episcopal participation in lawmaking
is evident from the earliest Anglo-Saxon written legislation, which made protection
for the church and clergy a priority, and it was not unusual for royal law codes to
be drafted by a king’s religious advisors.14 Ecclesiastical councils appear to have become increasingly absorbed into royal assemblies in the ninth century, and tenthcentury legislation refers repeatedly to the will of “the king and his councilors,”

11
Sarah Hamilton, “Inquiring into Adultery and Other Wicked Deeds: Episcopal Justice in Tenthand Early Eleventh-Century Italy,” Viator 41 (2010): 21–44, identiﬁes a similar lacuna in the historiography of tenth- and eleventh-century ecclesiastical justice in Italy. For examinations of the integration of secular and ecclesiastical interests in Anglo-Saxon law, see Wormald, Making of English Law,
esp. 418–29, 449–65; Stefan Jurasinski, The Old English Penitentials and Anglo-Saxon Law (Cambridge, UK, 2015); Lisi Oliver, “Royal and Ecclesiastical Law in Seventh-Century Kent,” in Early Medieval Studies in Memory of Patrick Wormald, ed. Stephen Baxter, Catherine E. Karkov, Janet L. Nelson, and David Pelteret (Farnham, UK, 2009), 97–112; Carole Hough, “Penitential Literature and
Secular Law in Anglo-Saxon England,” Anglo-Saxon Studies in Archaeology and History 11 (2000):
133–41; Catherine Cubitt, “Bishops and Councils in Late Saxon England: The Intersection of Secular
and Ecclesiastical Law,” in Recht und Gericht in Kirche und Welt um 900, ed. Wilfried Hartmann
and Annette Grabowsky (Munich, 2007), 151–67; Allen J. Frantzen, The Literature of Penance in
Anglo-Saxon England (New Brunswick, NJ, 1983), 124–27; Thomas Pollock Oakley, English Penitential Discipline and Anglo-Saxon Law in Their Joint Inﬂuence (New York, 1923).
12
For ecclesiastical ritual, see, for example, Sarah Hamilton, “Rites for Public Penance in Late AngloSaxon England,” in The Liturgy of the Late Anglo-Saxon Church, ed. Helen Gittos and M. Bradford
Bedingﬁeld (London, 2005), 65–103; Hamilton, “Remedies for ‘Great Transgressions’: Penance and Excommunication in Late Anglo-Saxon England,” in Pastoral Care in Late Anglo-Saxon England, ed.
Francesca Tinti (Woodbridge, UK, 2005), 83–105; Brad Bedingﬁeld, “Public Penance in Anglo-Saxon
England,” Anglo-Saxon England 31 (2002): 223–55. For political perspectives, see, for example, Catherine Cubitt, “Individual and Collective Sinning in Tenth- and Eleventh-Century England: Penance, Piety
and the Law,” in Religion und Politik im Mittelalter: Deutschland und England im Vergleich, ed. Ludger
Körntgen and Dominik Wassenhoven (Berlin, 2013), 51–70; Cubitt, “The Politics of Remorse: Penance
and Royal Piety in the Reign of Æthelred the Unready,” Historical Research 85 (2011): 1–14; Levi
Roach, “Public Rites and Public Wrongs: Ritual Aspects of Diplomas in Tenth- and Eleventh-Century
England,” Early Medieval Europe 19 (2011): 182–203; Roach, “Penance, Submission and deditio: Religious Inﬂuences on Dispute Settlement in Later Anglo-Saxon England (871–1066),” Anglo-Saxon England 41 (2012): 343–71.
13
For Continental practice, see Hamilton, “Episcopal Justice”; Hamilton, “Penance and Excommunication,” 94; Morris, “William I and the Church Courts,” 451–57; Greta Austin, “Jurisprudence in
the Service of Pastoral Care: The Decretum of Burchard of Worms,” Speculum 79/4 (2004): 929–59.
14
An ecclesiastical focus is evident in the laws of Kentish kings Æthelberht (d. c. 616) and Wihtræd
(d. 725), as well as in those of the West Saxon king Ine (d. c. 726). Ecclesiastical authorship of royal
law codes or inﬂuence over their production is attested throughout the pre-Conquest period: see Oliver, “Royal and Ecclesiastical Law”; Lisi Oliver, The Beginnings of English Law (Toronto, 2002), 14–
20, 83–85, and 164–80; Wormald, Making of English Law, esp. 299–300, 310, 330–39, and 449–65.
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778 Secular and Ecclesiastical Justice in Late Anglo-Saxon England
emphasizing the role of bishops in shaping written law.15 While the line between
secular and ecclesiastical ofﬁces may have been sharply drawn among participants
in these processes, the legal and political activities of religious and lay magnates must
have looked very much alike. Moreover, the absence of clearly deﬁned judicial institutions—as well as the shared vocabulary used to describe religious and earthly justice—has obscured how Anglo-Saxon authorities understood the differences between
ecclesiastical and secular jurisdictions.16 Although there is now wider agreement
among scholars that these spheres were distinguished in some way, there has been
little investigation of the precise relationship between them.17
The following discussion aims to illuminate some pre-Conquest attitudes toward secular and ecclesiastical justice. I will focus predominantly on the writings
of Archbishop Wulfstan, with some reference to those of his contemporary, Abbot
Ælfric of Eynsham (d. c. 1010), with whom he maintained a correspondence. These
two ecclesiastics were among the most proliﬁc authors of the later Anglo-Saxon period. Wulfstan was already known as a homilist when he became bishop of London
in 996, and he continued to produce sermons after his elevation to the sees of York
and Worcester in 1002. It was around this time that he was in contact with Ælfric, a
homilist and monk of Cerne Abbey and, by 1005, abbot of Eynsham. At Wulfstan’s
request, Ælfric composed a series of Old English and Latin letters synthesizing
points of canon law that would be especially pertinent to the work of an archbishop.18
These letters were copied or adapted in several compilations associated with Wulfstan: they were integrated into his collections of canon law and seem to have inspired
sermons and other tracts in his “commonplace book” manuscripts.19 Wulfstan’s man15
Cubitt, “Bishops and Councils”; Cubitt, “Individual and Collective Sinning,” 59–60, 69–70; Levi
Roach, Kingship and Consent in Anglo-Saxon England, 871–978 (Cambridge, UK, 2013), esp. 104–
21. Bishops and other ecclesiastics are explicitly referred to as legislative advisors throughout the tenth
and eleventh centuries, as well as in earlier Anglo-Saxon law codes: see Wihtræd prol.; Ine prol.;
I Æthelstan prol.; II Æthelstan epilogue; III Æthelstan prol.; VI Æthelstan prol.; I Edmund prol.;
II Edmund prol.; III Edmund prol.; V Æthelred prol.; and VI Æthelred prol. The advice of royal councilors in lawmaking is cited in IV Æthelstan 1; V Æthelstan prol. 1; II Edgar prol.; IV Edgar 1;
I Æthelred prol.; II Æthelred prol.; III Æthelred prol.; VIII Æthelred prol.; IX Æthelred prol.;
X Æthelred 2; Cnut 1018 prol.; I Cnut prol.; II Cnut prol. All laws are cited by their conventional
titles and chapter divisions, following Liebermann, Gesetze, above, n. 2; and A. G. Kennedy, “Cnut’s
Law Code of 1018,” Anglo-Saxon England 11 (1982): 57–81.
16
The shared vocabulary for ecclesiastical and secular justice in pre-Conquest England is discussed
further below; and see also the discussion of early medieval Latin vocabulary for wrongdoing in
Hyams, “Crime and Tort,” 109–10, 115.
17
For example, Richard Helmholz, Oxford History of the Laws of England, 1:57, acknowledges
that some distinction must have existed between the secular and ecclesiastical spheres; however, when
it comes to speciﬁc details, “beyond recognizing that the division existed in the minds of the AngloSaxons, it may be wiser to remain silent.” Compare Barlow, English Church, 137–53, 255–59 (and
above, n. 8); Cowdrey, Lanfranc, 120–43.
18
Ælfric’s pastoral letters and their context are discussed by Peter Clemoes, “Supplement to the Introduction,” in Bernhard Fehr, Die Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics in Altenglischer und Lateinischer Fassung, rev.
ed. (Darmstadt, 1966), cxxvii–cxlviii; Joyce Hill, “Monastic Reform and the Secular Church: Ælfric’s
Pastoral Letters in Context,” in England in the Eleventh Century: Proceedings of the 1990 Harlaxton
Symposium, ed. Carola Hicks (Stamford, 1992), 103–17; J. E. Cross and Andrew Hamer, eds.,
Wulfstan’s Canon Law Collection (Cambridge, UK, 1999), 17–22. See further below, n. 44.
19
Wulfstan’s so-called commonplace book is a collection of texts—reproduced in different permutations across several manuscripts—compiled by or for Wulfstan, comprised of the archbishop’s
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uscript compilations also included Old English laws, with decrees of earlier AngloSaxon kings preserved alongside the archbishop’s own legislation, composed between 1008 and 1023 for the West Saxon king Æthelred II (r. 978–1016) and the
Danish conqueror Cnut (r. 1016–35). The religious principles articulated in various
“commonplace book” texts informed Wulfstan’s approach to royal lawmaking, and
it is possible to identify an increasingly cohesive legal ideology—which linked national
prosperity to adherence to Christian principles—as his legislative career progressed.
The hazy boundaries between secular and ecclesiastical concerns in Wulfstan’s
manuscripts, as well as the religious rhetoric that dominates his royal laws, appear
to emblematize the all-encompassing approach to justice typically associated with
the pre-Conquest period.20 His dual role as “homilist and statesman” placed him
in an ideal position to infuse secular regulation with religious sensibilities.21 His impulse to align earthly law with divine will emerges clearly in his writings, and the
religious priorities in his royal legislation aimed to shape a “holy society” pleasing
to God.22 This does not mean, however, that Wulfstan saw no distinction between
royal and religious law, or that he sought to conﬂate secular and ecclesiastical justice. On the contrary, Wulfstan was clear that religious authorities—especially bishops—held judicial rights and responsibilities distinct from their lay counterparts’.
To some extent, this mirrors the approach employed by Wulfstan’s contemporaries
across the Channel: recent studies of tenth- and eleventh-century Continental canon
law compilations reveal an increasing interest in episcopal justice and ecclesiastical
jurisdictions, distinct from the secular arm.23 Although Wulfstan consistently urged
cooperation among secular and religious authorities, I propose that he joined his

own writings alongside texts by other authors. For the contents and signiﬁcance of these manuscripts,
see especially Dorothy Bethurum, “Archbishop Wulfstan’s Commonplace Book,” PMLA 57 (1942):
916–29; Hans Sauer, “The Transmission and Structure of Archbishop Wulfstan’s ‘Commonplace Book,’”
in Old English Prose: Basic Readings, ed. Paul E. Szarmach (New York, 2000), 339–93; Christopher A.
Jones, “Two Composite Texts from Archbishop Wulfstan’s ‘Commonplace Book’: The De ecclesiastica consuetudine and the Institutio beati Amalarii de ecclesiasticis ofﬁciis,” Anglo-Saxon England 27
(1998): 233–71; Michael D. Elliot, “Wulfstan’s Commonplace Book Revised: The Structure and Development of ‘Block 7,’ on Pastoral Privilege and Responsibility,” Journal of Medieval Latin 22 (2012): 1–48;
Wormald, Making of English Law, 213–19. Versions of Wulfstan’s canon law collection, also known as
the Collectio Wigorniensis or the Excerptiones pseudo-Ecgberhti, are included in various “commonplace book” manuscripts: this material is edited by Cross and Hamer, Wulfstan’s Canon Law; Michael
D. Elliot, “Canon Law Collections in England ca 600–1066: The Manuscript Evidence” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2013), 169–88, 809–1111.
20
Wormald, Making of English Law, esp. 339–49, 363–65, and 449–65; M. K. Lawson, “Archbishop Wulfstan and the Homiletic Element in the Laws of Æthelred II and Cnut,” English Historical
Review 107 (1992): 565–86.
21
The epithet is Dorothy Whitelock’s: Whitelock, “Archbishop Wulfstan, Homilist and Statesman.”
22
The phrase is Patrick Wormald’s: Wormald, “Archbishop Wulfstan and the Holiness of Society.”
See also Wormald, Making of English Law, 449–65; Lawson, “Archbishop Wulfstan.”
23
For Continental compilations, see, for example, Hamilton, “Episcopal Justice,” 36–40; Sarah
Hamilton, The Practice of Penance, 900–1050 (Woodbridge, UK, 2001), 45–50; Austin, “Jurisprudence in the Service of Pastoral Care”; Rob Meens, Penance in Medieval Europe: 600–1200 (Cambridge, UK, 2014), esp. 140–89; Meens, “Penitentials and the Practice of Penance in the Tenth and
Eleventh Centuries,” Early Medieval Europe 14 (2006): 7–21. Wulfstan’s manuscripts are contextualized within this tradition by Patrick Wormald: see Wormald, Making of English Law, 456–57; Wormald, “Archbishop Wulfstan and the Holiness of Society,” 239–40.

Speculum 94/3 (July 2019)

This content downloaded from 131.194.080.101 on July 05, 2019 12:01:35 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

780 Secular and Ecclesiastical Justice in Late Anglo-Saxon England
Continental counterparts in envisioning a sphere of ecclesiastical jurisdiction independent of secular control.
Jurisdictional Divisions and Royal Law
Wulfstan looked to England’s past for models of good law and government. This
impulse is clearest in his adaptation of clauses from previous kings’ laws in his own
codes for Æthelred and Cnut. Yet Wulfstan also regarded earlier legislation as a
source for ideological principles whose implementation would restore the nation
to its former glory. Accordingly, his reading of England’s past legislation was a
practical one: what made earlier rulers’ laws successful? He provides one answer
in his 1014 law code VIII Æthelred, in clause 36: “Wise wæran worldwitan, þe
to godcundan rihtlagan woroldlaga settan, folce to steore, ⁊ Criste ⁊ cyninge gerihtan þa bote, þar man swa scolde manega for neode gewildan to rihte” (Wise were
those earthly counselors who set earthly laws to divine law, to guide the people, and
who adjudged compensation to Christ and the king—by which many people, by necessity, had to submit to justice).24 This clause articulates a recurring theme in
Wulfstan’s legislation: that good earthly law must operate in both secular and ecclesiastical spheres, with the best legislators shaping their decrees to conform with divine will.25 Later, the same law code praises kings Æthelstan (r. 924–39), Edmund
(r. 939–46), and Edgar (r. 959–75) for having “God weorðodon ⁊ Godes lage
heoldon ⁊ Godes gafel læstan, þa hwile þe hi leofodon” (honored God and held
God’s law and rendered God’s offerings, as long as they lived), and these rulers’ incorporation of penitential requirements in their legislation served as a model for
Wulfstan.26 His own assignment of double penalties—“compensation to Christ
and the king”—continued this tenth-century tradition by requiring offenders to
make amends to both religious and temporal authorities.27 As clear as this binary
division seems, however, Wulfstan’s vocabulary in VIII Æthelred 36 blurs the line
between secular and ecclesiastical interests. First, the Old English term riht (rendered above as “justice”) encompasses a range of possibile meanings, including
moral virtue, righteous behavior, and lawful justice. This passage elides these concepts. With double penalties facilitating both religious and secular redemption, riht
applies comfortably to both spheres and effaces the boundary between spiritual reha-

24
Wulfstan makes similar points elsewhere in his corpus: see Edward and Guthrum prol. 2 (quoted
above, 1 and n. 2) ; Hadbot 11; Grið 24; Dorothy Bethurum, The Homilies of Wulfstan (Oxford,
1957), 277, no. 21.
25
Wulfstan indicates in other contexts that kings must rely on bishops’ advice in order to align
earthly legislation with divine law: Gates, “Preaching, Politics, and Episcopal Reform,” 115–16.
26
VIII Æthelred 43. Penance was prescribed in royal law with some regularity from the reign of Alfred (r. 871–99), whom Wulfstan acknowledged as a good lawmaker in Edward and Guthrum prol.;
for Alfred’s introduction of penitential requirements into royal law, see Frantzen, Literature of Penance, 124–27. Penance may also have been required in the laws of Wihtræd, promulgated in 696:
Oliver, Beginnings of English Law, 154–55, 167–68; Oliver, “Royal and Ecclesiastical Law”; Frantzen, Literature of Penance, 79; but compare Hough, “Penitential Literature and Secular Law,” 133–34.
For Wulfstan’s use of earlier Old English legislation, see Wormald, Making of English Law, 344,
352–66.
27
See further below, n. 83.
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bilitation and criminal punishment.28 Second, bot generally refers to legal compensation in Anglo-Saxon law codes, but it was also the standard Old English term for
penance.29 In this clause, Wulfstan leaves the distinction vague: awarding bot to
Christ could mean that earthly ﬁnes were to be rendered to the church, but it
may also indicate that penance was required by royal law. Finally, Wulfstan recalls
that earlier laws were set “folce to steore” (to guide the people). While variants of
this phrase are used to describe good leadership in other contemporary texts, in
which steore would be rendered “steer” or “guide,” Wulfstan often uses steore to
denote judicial or otherworldly punishment.30 In the legislative context of VIII
Æthelred, this diction offers the hint of a threat behind the rhetoric of guidance.
The note of compulsion in the ﬁnal phrase—people will be corrected “for neode”:
“by necessity” or, possibly, “for their own good” or even “by force”—furthers this
impression.31
Although Wulfstan is clear in VIII Æthelred 36 that compensation should ideally
encompass both material and spiritual remedies, the inclusion of this sentiment in a
royal law code—especially with an intimation of duress—indicates that penalties
were to be exacted by secular means. Earthly law (woroldlaga) might be aligned
with divine law (godcundan rihtlagan), but it nevertheless remained an instrument
of mundane authorities. By this logic, Wulfstan’s ideal government would empower
the king and his agents to take action against all categories of wrongdoing. The
problem was that this ideal was not being met. Whereas past kings had sought to
align their laws with God’s will, Wulfstan asserts that this approach had been abandoned in recent years, “æfter Eadgares lifdagum” (after Edgar’s lifetime).32 As he
explains in VIII Æthelred 38, “And þa man getwæmde þæt ær wæs gemæne Criste
⁊ cynincge on worldlicre steore; ⁊ a hit wearð þe wirse for Gode ⁊ for worlde; cume
nu to bote, gif hit God wille” (And then was divided that which before was common
to Christ and the king in earthly punishment. And ever it became worse before God

28
The various meanings of riht in Old English law are discussed by Daniela Fruscione, “Riht in Earlier Anglo-Saxon Legislation: A Semasiological Approach,” Historical Research 86 (2013): 498–504.
See also T. Northcote Toller, ed., An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary Based on the Manuscript Collections of
the Late Joseph Bosworth (hereafter cited as Bosworth-Toller) (Oxford, 1898), available online at
http://bosworth.ff.cuni.cz/ (last accessed 31 October 2017), s.v. “riht.”
29
Angus Cameron, Ashley Crandell Amos, Antonette diPaolo Healey, et al., eds., Dictionary of Old
English: A to H Online (hereafter cited as DOE) (Toronto, 2016), http://doe.utoronto.ca (last accessed
31 October 2017), s.v. “bōt,” sections b‒c; and see further below.
30
For example, Ælfric of Eynsham applies the phrase to Moses bringing the Ten Commandments
“to steore” mankind—a formulation he uses in his pastoral letters to Wulfstan (“mancynne to steore,”
“eallum mannum to steore”): Ælfric of Eynsham, Letters II.10 and III.120, ed. Fehr, Hirtenbriefe
Ælfrics, 74–75, 188–91; and see further below, n. 44. Wulfstan, by contrast, uses to steore in reference
to earthly penalties incurred by religious violations in VI Æthelred 51 and Bethurum, Homilies of
Wulfstan, 276, no. 21; compare also the later eleventh-century Northumbrian Priests’ Law 54.1.
Wulfstan also uses steor in reference to divine punishment, corporal punishment for canons, and punishment imposed by earthly (worldlice) authorities: see Bethurum, Homilies of Wulfstan, 254 and 193,
nos. 19 and 10a; VIII Æthelred 38; Arthur Napier, Wulfstan (Berlin, 1883), 266 and 311, nos. l and lxi;
Karl Jost, Die “Institutes of Polity, Civil and Ecclesiastical” (Bern, 1959), 44–45. See also BosworthToller, s.v. “steóran,” sections i.a, iv; “steór,” sections i, iii, and v.
31
Bosworth-Toller, s.v. “níd.”
32
VIII Æthelred 37.
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and before the world. Let it now come to correction, if God will it).33 More clearly
this time, royal and religious penalties of the past are linked together as “earthly
punishment” (worldlicre steore), both to be administered in the secular realm.
What, then, did Wulfstan mean by his complaint that a uniﬁed (gemæne) mode
of earthly justice had been divided?
I propose that an answer can be found in the shifting focus and tone of AngloSaxon legislation in the second half of the tenth century. Wulfstan noted his admiration for several lawmaking kings in his corpus, but the laws of Æthelred’s father,
Edgar, best embodied the ideals the archbishop sought to emulate in style, content,
and structure. From their opening clauses, Edgar’s codes articulate more explicitly
than any of his predecessors’ the connection between good law and divine favor:
royal legislation must be obeyed “Gode to lofe ⁊ ure ealra saula to þearfe ⁊ eallum
folce to friðe” (for love of God, and for the necessity of all our souls, and for peace
among all the people).34 The kingdom’s prosperity thus requires the enforcement of
correct religious practice. Edgar’s laws regulate ecclesiastical dues, tithing schedules, observance of feasts and fasts, and protection of churches (ciricgrið), as well
as mandating that the population obey the nation’s bishops and that laymen ensure
that all religious obligations are met.35 The importance of these rules is further emphasized by the structure of Edgar’s extant law codes, which give ecclesiastical
clauses their own designated sections.36 By treating religious guidelines as a subset
of secular law, worthy of inclusion in a royal code yet distinct from mundane concerns, Edgar simultaneously assumed responsibility for the well-being of the earthly
church and recognized ecclesiastical rules as a self-contained category, distinct from
criminal regulation.
Edgar’s legislation is also concerned with local procedure, notably in the mandate
that lay and ecclesiastical authorities collaborate at shire courts: “þær beo on ðære
scire biscop ⁊ se ealdorman, ⁊ þær ægðer tæcan ge Godes riht ge woruldriht” (the
bishop and the ealdorman of the shire shall be there, and they shall direct both God’s
justice and earthly justice there).37 Wulfstan would later require the same approach,
33

Compare the similar formulation quoted above, 1 and n. 2.
IV Edgar 15, and compare also II Edgar prol. This command is framed as a response to a divine
punishment of plague, which “mid synnum ⁊ mid oferhyrnysse Godes beboda geearnod wære” (was
earned with sin and with contempt for God’s command): IV Edgar 1.
35
For ecclesiastical dues, see II Edgar 1.1, 2–2.3, 5.2; IV Edgar 1–1.8. For tithing schedules and
timely payment, II Edgar 2.3–4; IV Edgar 1.4–1.5. For feasts and fasts, II Edgar 5–5.1. For protection
of churches (ciricgrið), II Edgar 5.3. For obedience to bishops, IV Edgar 1.8. For lay enforcment of
religious rules, IV Edgar 1.5, 1.8, 15. Many of these obligations were required by Anglo-Saxon royal
law before Edgar’s: see, for example, Ine 3, 4, 5–5.1, 61; Alfred 2.1, 5, 5.5, 6–6.1, 40.1–2; I Æthelstan;
Æthelstan Alms; II Æthelstan 5, 24.1; III Æthelstan 1.1; I Edmund 2, 5; II Edmund 2.
36
Edgar’s two-part Andover legislation, II–III Edgar, treated ecclesiastical and secular regulations in
separate sections, and there is a comparable division in IV Edgar, with clauses 1–1.8 focused on religious matters and clauses 2–14 focused on earthly matters. However, both texts reveal overlap between spiritual and secular concerns: see Wormald, Making of English Law, 313–20. Æthelstan
and Edmund also promulgated self-contained sets of religious mandates in addition to law codes concerned predominantly with secular affairs: see I Æthelstan, Æthelstan Alms, and I Edmund; Cubitt,
“Bishops and Councils,” 156–57.
37
III Edgar 5.2. This collaborative approach mirrors Carolingian practice, which called for cooperation between lay and ecclesiastical authorities in administering justice and enforcing the law: an overview is provided by Hamilton, “Episcopal Justice,” 26–29. For Wulfstan’s reliance on Carolingian
34

Speculum 94/3 (July 2019)

This content downloaded from 131.194.080.101 on July 05, 2019 12:01:35 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

Secular and Ecclesiastical Justice in Late Anglo-Saxon England 783
replicating this clause verbatim in his laws for Cnut.38 During the early decades of
Æthelred’s reign, by contrast, Wulfstan claimed that the kingdom had moved away
from the type of collaborative justice that characterized Edgar’s legislation, with the
separation of punishments once “common to Christ and the king” proving detrimental to the kingdom’s health.39 Certainly, the tenor of written law changed after
Edgar’s death, and this shift may help illuminate Wulfstan’s critique. From Æthelred’s accession in 978 until Wulfstan began drafting royal legislation in 1008, royal
law was dominated by secular matters, without corresponding sections of ecclesiastical rules.40 In the various instructions concerning local and regional courts issued
during these three decades, there was no stated requirement that laymen and clergy
administer justice together. This seems to reﬂect a new legislative strategy, which
departed from Edgar’s: instead of unifying ecclesiastical and secular justice under
the king’s authority, Æthelred’s pre-Wulfstanian laws decoupled religious regulations from royal law.41 In this context, Wulfstan’s concerns about the division of
punishments should not be read as an abstract complaint but as a direct response
to recent legal developments. The exhortation in VIII Æthelred 38 that this situation “cume nu to bote” (come now to correction) indicates that Wulfstan was calling for speciﬁc practices to be remedied.
So what motivated these changes? Edgar’s integrated approach to law and justice
was likely informed by the ideology of the tenth-century monastic reforms, which
fostered close collaboration between the king and high-ranking ecclesiastics.42 After
Edgar’s death, England’s political landscape became more complicated. A protracted
succession debate between Edgar’s young sons, conﬂicts among the nobility, and the
resumption of Viking attacks in England moved the nation away from the unifying
ideals of the previous regime. Where contemporary accounts of Edgar’s reign (composed predominantly by reforming ecclesiastics) praised the king’s engagement with
religious institutions, the next generation of authors proved more wary of lay involvement in church affairs.43 Their anxiety about the corrupting inﬂuence of the secular world extended to the administration of justice. Most prominently, Ælfric of
sources and models, see, for example, Patrick Wormald, “Archbishop Wulfstan: Eleventh-Century
State Builder,” in Townend, Wulfstan, Archbishop of York, 9–27; Joyce Hill, “Archbishop Wulfstan:
Reformer?,” in Townend, Wulfstan, Archbishop of York, 309–24; Christopher A. Jones, “Wulfstan’s
Liturgical Interests,” in Townend, Wulfstan, Archbishop of York, 325–52.
38
II Cnut 18.1. For councils comprised of lay and ecclesiastical authorities, see Cubitt, “Bishops and
Councils,” 154–59; Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 45–49; Cowdrey, Lanfranc, 123. Compare also
Anglo-Saxon synods classiﬁed as concilia mixta, in which ecclesiastical matters were considered under
royal oversight: see Catherine Cubitt, Anglo-Saxon Church Councils c. 650–c. 850 (London, 1995), 6–
8, 44–59; Helmholz, Oxford History of the Laws of England, 1:14–19.
39
VIII Æthelred 38; see above, n. 33.
40
As Wormald, Making of English Law, 328, notes, Æthelred’s early laws were “as resolutely secular as Wulfstan’s were overwhelmingly ecclesiastical.”
41
Given the length and thoroughness of these texts, this secular focus seems to be an intentional
strategy and not the result of careless omission. In Wormald’s words, “English legislation had seldom
before been so thoroughly planned”: Wormald, Making of English Law, 325.
42
I argue this point at greater length in “King Edgar and the Laws of Archbishop Wulfstan,” in Remembering the Present: Generative Uses of the Anglo-Saxon Past, ed. Jay Paul Gates and Brian
O’Camb (Leiden, forthcoming).
43
Maraﬁoti, “Edgar and the Laws of Wulfstan.” For the increasing inﬂuence of high-ranking laity in
ecclesiastical affairs, see Cubitt, “Individual and Collective Sinning,” 51–56.
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784 Secular and Ecclesiastical Justice in Late Anglo-Saxon England
Eynsham cautioned strongly against the clergy’s participation in secular courts, and
it is signiﬁcant that his fullest discussions of this matter appear in the pastoral letters
he wrote for Wulfstan.44 One of Ælfric’s concerns was that criminal trials—like any
other earthly activity—distracted clergymen from completing their spiritual work as
pastors.45 The greater problem, though, was that “illa manus quę humanum sanguinem effuderit non potest digne domini calicem sanctiﬁcare” (the hand that spills
human blood cannot worthily sanctify the chalice of the Lord).46 Because bloodshed
was a fundamental element of earthly justice, clergy were prohibited from rendering
secular judgments: “We ne moton beon ymbe mannes deað. Þeah he manslaga beo
oþþe morðfremmende oþþe mycel þeofman, swaþeah we ne scylan him deað getæcean. Na we ne motan deman ymbe þæt” (We may not be involved in the death of a
man. Even if he is a killer or a murderer or a great thief, nevertheless, we must not
prescribe death for him. We may never make a judgment concerning that).47 Instead,
“seculares iudices debent iudicare de furibus et latronibus, quia canones prohibent
episcopos uel clericos de his iudicare” (secular judges ought to judge concerning
thieves and robbers, because the canons prohibit bishops or clerics to judge concerning them).48 Ælfric did not object to the application of physical punishments per se,
but he feared that clerical participation would degrade the purity of the church.49
Ælfric’s concerns were not unfounded, for there is ample evidence around the
turn of the millennium that high-ranking clergy rendered judgment in secular

44
Ælfric composed these texts after Wulfstan’s elevation to York in 1002. The Old English and
Latin letters are edited by Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics; and see also the digital edition by Michael D.
Elliot, Anglo-Saxon Canon Law (2015), http://individual.utoronto.ca/michaelelliot/index.html (last accessed 31 October 2017). For dating and context, see especially Peter Clemoes, “Supplement to the
Introduction,” in Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, cxxvii–cxlviii; Peter Clemoes, “The Old English Benedictine Ofﬁce, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, MS 190, and the Relations Between Ælfric and
Wulfstan: A Reconsideration,” Anglia 78 (1960): 265–83; Joyce Hill, “Ælfric, His Life and Works,”
in A Companion to Ælfric, ed. Mary Swan and Hugh Magennis (Leiden, 2009), 35–65, at 58–63; Hill,
“Archbishop Wulfstan: Reformer?,” 113–17; Joyce Hill, “Monastic Reform and the Secular Church,”
103–17; Malcolm Godden, “The Relations of Wulfstan and Ælfric: A Reassessment,” in Townend,
Wulfstan, Archbishop of York, 353–74; Cross and Hamer, Wulfstan’s Canon Law, 17–22.
45
“Sed ualde dolendum est, quia his diebus tanta neglegentia est in episcopis qui deberent esse
columpne aecclesiae, ut non adtendant diuinam scripturam nec docent discipulos qui sibi succedant
in episcopatum . . . sed honores seculares et cupiditates uel auaritiam sectantes plus quam laici mala
exempla subditis prebentes” (For it is truly to be regretted, that in these days there is such negligence
among the bishops, who ought to be pillars of the Church, that they do not pay attention to divine
scripture nor teach students who will succeed them in the episcopacy . . . but are following secular honors and desires or avarice more than the laity do, presenting a bad example to their underlings): Ælfric
of Eynsham, Letter 2a.15, ed. Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 226–27. This passage appears toward the
end of a discussion on clerical participation in secular justice; see further below.
46
Ælfric of Eynsham, Letter 2a.14, ed. Fehr, 225. This chapter is concerned with clergy committing
injuries in warfare or in arguments, and the following chapter is concerned with clerical participation
in secular justice; see below, n. 48.
47
Ælfric of Eynsham, Letter II.201, ed. Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 140–41.
48
Ælfric of Eynsham, Letter 2a.15, ed. Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 226.
49
Nicole Maraﬁoti, “Punishing Bodies and Saving Souls: Capital and Corporal Punishment in Late
Anglo-Saxon England,” Haskins Society Journal 20 (2008): 39–57; and compare William E. Bolton,
“‘We Ne Motan Deman Ymbe Þæt’: Clerical Judgment in Ælfric of Eynsham’s Life of Saints Swithun,
Edmund, and Æthelwold,” Viator 46 (2015): 21–42.
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cases.50 Latin hagiographies of the later tenth century recalled that Archbishop Dunstan of Canterbury ordered the amputation of forgers’ hands and Bishop Ælfheah
of Winchester sentenced a thief to ﬂogging; both actions were described as the just
enforcement of the law.51 In the same period, there are records of abbots pronouncing outlawry, which offenders could avoid through material payments.52 Bishop
Oscytel of Dorchester was reportedly ready to pronounce a death sentence for a
thieving priest, had the offender’s friends not secured a lesser sentence through a generous gift to his church.53 Other accounts attest that clergy deliberated with secular magnates to issue sentences for material offenses. Archbishop Dunstan, Bishop
Æthelwold of Winchester, and two other bishops were named as participants in a
royal council that ruled a thief’s property forfeit;54 and in 996, two archbishops, six
bishops, and seven abbots participated in a council that pronounced a recalcitrant
nobleman’s life and property forfeit.55
Although proceedings like these may have been in line with the collaborative approach advocated in Edgar’s laws, there appears to have been a reaction against this
level of clerical participation in secular affairs by the later tenth century. As Ælfric
noted in his pastoral letter, “qui uero iudex aut occisor latronum est, non potest inter agnos innocentes computari” (whoever is a judge or killer of thieves cannot be

50

Barlow, English Church, 147–48.
Wulfstan of Winchester, The Life of St Æthelwold, ed. Michael Lapidge and Michael
Winterbottom (Oxford, 1991), 68–69; Eadmer of Canterbury, Lives and Miracles of Saints Oda, Dunstan, and Oswald, ed. Bernard J. Muir and Andrew J. Turner (Oxford, 2006), 119–23. See also Patrick
Wormald, “A Handlist of Anglo-Saxon Lawsuits,” Anglo-Saxon England 17 (1988): 247–81, nos. 158
and 174; Nicole Maraﬁoti and Jay Paul Gates, introduction to Capital and Corporal Punishment in
Anglo-Saxon England, ed. Gates and Maraﬁoti (Woodbridge, UK, 2014), 1–16, at 6–7.
52
A list of sureties for property at Peterborough notes that two men transferred an estate to Abbot
Eadulf: “hi þat lande guldun æt Macusige for ðan utlage þa he on Wulnoðe worhte” (they paid over
the estate at Maxey for the outlawry which he [i.e., Eadulf] pronounced on Wulfnoth): A. J. Robertson, Anglo-Saxon Charters (Cambridge, UK, 1956), 78–81, no. 40 (I follow Robertson’s translations).
A comparable construction, which probably indicates another abbatial sentence of outlawry, notes
that one Osgot transferred an estate to Abbot Ealdulf, “þe he geald him for þam utlage þe he Styrcyr
ofslogh” (which he paid over to him for the outlawry he had incurred through slaying Styrcyr); Robertson, Charters, 76–79, no. 40. This text should be dated between 963 and 992: see Robertson, Charters, 330; Wormald, “Handlist,” 262, nos. 50–51.
53
The other possible outcome was that the thief would be ejected from his order, but it seems that
neither of these sentences was enacted. The episode is recorded in the Liber Eliensis, where it is dated to
the reign of Edgar: see E. O. Blake, ed., Lieber Eliensis (London, 1962), 106; Janet Fairweather, trans.,
Liber Eliensis: A History of the Isle of Ely from the Seventh Century to the Twelfth (Woodbridge,
UK, 2005), 129; Wormald, “Handlist,” 267, no. 124.
54
The episode occurred during the reign of Edgar but was recorded between 975 and 987: Robertson, Charters, 123, no. 59; see also Wormald, “Handlist,” 262, no. 45. This charter is catalogued in
P. H. Sawyer, Anglo-Saxon Charters: An Annotated List and Bibliography (London, 1968), no. 1457
(henceforth cited as S1457).
55
“Þa getæhton ealle þæt witan þe þær wæron ge gehadode ge læwide þam cynge ealle Wulboldes
ære 7 hine silfne to þam þe se cynge wolde swa to life swa to deaþe” (Then all the witan who were
present—both clergy and lay—assigned to the king all of Wulfbold’s property as well as his life, so that
the king would decide if he should live or go to his death); Robertson, Charters, 129, no. 63; Wormald,
“Handlist,” 262–63, nos. 57–58; S877. The text goes on to list the individuals who participated in this
decision (“þis sind þa men þa wæron æt þa tacinge”) and record the subsequent decision against
Wulfbold’s widow and son.
51
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786 Secular and Ecclesiastical Justice in Late Anglo-Saxon England
numbered among the innocent lambs).56 Attitudes like his must have inspired a
greater separation of secular and ecclesiastical justice in order to promote an ideal
of clerical purity, and I suggest that views of this sort motivated the drafters of
Æthelred’s pre-Wulfstanian law codes to focus exclusively on earthly offense and
regulation.57 Moreover, if the secular bent of written legislation was accompanied
by changes in judicial administration, it is reasonable to hypothesize that religious
offenses were removed from the jurisdiction of shire courts and addressed instead
through a separate process of ecclesiastical justice, overseen by clergy and governed
by canon law rather than royal decrees—a model consistent with contemporary
Continental practice and with post-Conquest approaches to justice.58 The logistics
of such a bifurcated system will be considered further below. For the present discussion, though, Wulfstan’s objections to the division of religious and secular penalties
in VIII Æthelred 36–38 make clearer sense if clergy and laymen had begun administering justice independently, instead of at a common gathering. Such a scenario
would also help explain why Wulfstan considered Edgar’s legislation to be so valuable: it provided a blueprint for judicial collaboration between laymen and ecclesiastics. The success of Edgar’s reign proved that his collaborative model was effective and in line with God’s will. Accordingly, Wulfstan built on the content and
structure of Edgar’s laws in his efforts to restore this lost status quo ante.59 In 1008,
he reintroduced religious rhetoric and regulations into royal legislation with V–
VI Æthelred; in 1014, he codiﬁed his admiration for earlier kings’ alignment of secular and divine justice with VIII Æthelred; and in the 1020s, he revived judicial collaboration as a legal requirement in I–II Cnut.60
Wulfstan’s ideal was a law that gave religious and secular priorities equal weight,
keeping spiritual and earthly order by compelling offenders to submit both to ecclesiastical and temporal justice. Still, it is important to note that this uniﬁed approach
was not automatic or inevitable. Neither should it be attributed to an inability or
disinclination to differentiate religious from secular wrongdoing. Ælfric advocated
that clear boundaries between the mundane and religious spheres be maintained,
and the secular focus of Æthelred’s pre-Wulfstanian legislation indicates that this
approach was considered valid by high-ranking royal advisors. Based on the passages quoted above, it is clear that Wulfstan also recognized secular and ecclesiastical justice as distinct, separable processes. However, he appears to have been en56

Ælfric of Eynsham, Letter 2a.15, ed. Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 226.
Simon Keynes has identiﬁed a shift in Æthelred’s advisors in the early 990s: a greater ecclesiastical
presence in witness lists coincided with a rise in grants of lands and privileges to religious institutions.
During this period, a number of royal grants framed the restoration of lands and privileges in penitential terms, with Æthelred expressing contrition for earlier abuses against the church at the advice of
bad advisors; it is conceivable that religious institutions were given a new degree of autonomy from
secular authorities. For Æthelred’s advisors and grants during this period, see especially Simon Keynes,
The Diplomas of King Æthelred “the Unready,” 978–1016 (Cambridge, UK, 1980), 176–202; compare also Wormald, Making of English Law, 323, for the inﬂuence of the royal advisors on Æthelred’s
pre-Wulfstanian law. For the penitential considerations behind these royal grants, see Cubitt, “Politics
of Remorse”; Roach, “Public Rites,” 193–99.
58
Above, n. 23.
59
Wormald, Making of English Law, 355–64; see also Maraﬁoti, “Edgar and the Laws of Wulfstan.”
60
V and VI Æthelred; VIII Æthelred 36–38; II Cnut 18.1.
57

Speculum 94/3 (July 2019)

This content downloaded from 131.194.080.101 on July 05, 2019 12:01:35 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

Secular and Ecclesiastical Justice in Late Anglo-Saxon England 787
gaging in a broader debate over the appropriate relationship between earthly and
religious law. In support of his own position, Wulfstan promulgated the historical
narrative that underpinned his laws: secular and ecclesiastical justice had been
united under Edgar (and other good kings of the past) and divided after Edgar’s
death, to the detriment of the kingdom. The surest way to restore God’s favor, by
this logic, was to revive the methods of government that had brought prosperity
to previous generations. The question, then, was how to unite ecclesiastical and secular processes while maintaining the integrity of each—preserving the purity of the
clergy, for instance, while ensuring that earthly punishment remained effective.61
What was the appropriate relationship between ecclesiastical and secular justice?
Judicial Jurisdictions in De medicamento animarum
and Old English Law
Wulfstan provides a detailed discussion of the relation between secular and ecclesiastical authority in a short Latin tract, De medicamento animarum, which is preserved in one of his “commonplace book” manuscripts.62 The piece opens with an
overview of bishops’ duties, including their obligation to impose penance; it then
prohibits laymen from participating in ecclesiastical judgments and clergy from participating in secular judgments; and it concludes with an exhortation to all the faithful to submit to Christian teaching. Throughout the text, discussions of penance,
teaching, and episcopal responsibility are framed in judicial terms, with markedly
legalistic vocabulary. In particular, Wulfstan is concerned with ecclesiastical judgments (iudicia ęclęsiastica), differentiating these ﬁrmly from secular judgments (secularibus iudiciis) and explaining that episcopal judges held powers distinct from
those of their secular counterparts.63
At ﬁrst glance, Wulfstan’s position here seems antithetical to the collaborative approach he advocates in VIII Æthelred, for De medicamento animarum states clearly
that “episcoporum enim est omnia iudicia ęclęsiastica rite disponere” (it is right that
bishops set all ecclesiastical judgments).64 The text continues:
61

See, for example, II Cnut 2 (5 III Edgar 1.2); quoted below, 30 and n. 134.
De medicamento animarum is preserved in the Wulfstanian manuscript London, British Library,
Cotton MS Nero A.i, with additions and corrections in the archbishop’s hand; the tract appears at
fols. 164–65, with Wulfstan’s writing on fols. 164r–v. The text is edited by Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1042–43; and Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 251–53; a facsimile is provided by Henry R. Loyn,
A Wulfstan Manuscript Containing Institutes, Laws and Homilies: British Museum Cotton Nero
A.I (Copenhagen, 1971), fols. 164–65, with commentary on the penitential theme of the manuscript’s
Latin texts at 52–53. A digital version of the manuscript is also available in the British Library’s
Digitised Manuscripts collection, at http://www.bl.uk/manuscripts/FullDisplay.aspx?ref5Cotton_MS
_Nero_A_I (last accessed 31 October 2017). Wulfstan’s notations are identiﬁed by Neil Ker, “The
Handwriting of Archbishop Wulfstan,” in England before the Conquest: Studies in Primary Sources
Presented to Dorothy Whitelock, ed. Peter Clemoes and Kathleen Hughes (Cambridge, UK, 1971),
315–31, at 324. Verbal similarities with other Wulfstanian texts are noted by Cross and Hamer,
Wulfstan’s Canon Law, 25–26; Elliot, “Wulfstan’s Commonplace Book,” 41–46.
63
Quotations are from Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1042; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 251–52;
and see below, nn. 64–65.
64
The full sentence reads, “Episcoporum enim est omnia iudicia ęclęsiastica rite disponere: et ut non
solum uerbis sed etiam exemplis omnes homines instruant: quia status christianę religionis et ęclę62
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788 Secular and Ecclesiastical Justice in Late Anglo-Saxon England
Episcopi quoque nullatenus secularibus iudiciis . aut negotiis: curis . uel causis . se
inportune ocupent sed eclesiasticis; Lectioni itaque et orationi et uerbi dei predicationi instanter uacent; Apostolus enim dicit; Nemo militans deo: implicet se negotiis secularibus;
Sicut enim distantia est ordinum: sic et distantia esse debet inter sacerdotale et seculare
iudicium: et nullus sibi usurpare presumat: quod suo ordini non conuenit.65
[Also, let bishops by no means importunely occupy themselves with administration or
pleas in secular judgments or lawsuits—only with ecclesiastical ones. Thus they may be
free for readings and orations and zealously preaching the word of God. For the Apostle
said: let no soldier of God involve himself in secular business.66 For just as there is distance
between the orders, so also there ought to be distance between priestly and secular judgments, and let no one presume to usurp for himself what is not suitable for his order.]

The delineation of episcopal duties is a familiar element of Wulfstan’s writings, as
are calls for the clergy to devote themselves zealously to their religious obligations.67
This excerpt also echoes Ælfric’s concerns that involvement in secular justice would
distract and corrupt the clergy.68 Unlike Ælfric, however, Wulfstan does not ground
his discussion in moral admonitions or prohibitions against bloodshed.69 In fact,
this passage focuses less on the spiritual implications of secular involvement than
on the distinction (distantia) between different types of judgments (iudicis) and pleas
or cases (causis), as well as the different groups responsible for overseeing them.70
Here, Wulfstan draws a clear line: bishops are required to issue ecclesiastical judgments and forbidden to issue earthly ones.
De medicamento animarum also places jurisdictional limits on secular authorities, ﬁrmly restricting the king and other laymen from intervening in ecclesiastical
justice.71 First, Wulfstan asserts that “laicorum autem non est sed sacerdotum dei:
de ęclęsiastices disputare iudiciis” (it is not for the laity but for the priests of God
to deliberate ecclesiastical judgments).72 He then lists a series of biblical and patristic
examples to support this point, concluding with the following comments:
siasticę dignitatis ad eorum curam maxime pertinet” (It is right that bishops set all ecclesiastical judgments; and that they instruct all men, not only with words but also by example, because the standing of
the Christian religion and of ecclesiastical dignity is held mostly in their care): Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1042; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 251.
65
Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1042–43; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 252.
66
The biblical admonition that clergy not participate in secular affairs (2 Tim. 2.4) is cited in Ælfric’s
Latin letter for Wulfstan, in the context of secular judgments: Ælfric of Eynsham, Letter 2a.15, ed.
Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 226. For the relation between Ælfric’s letters and the materials in Cotton
Nero A.i, see Cross and Hamer, Wulfstan’s Canon Law, 17–22.
67
For this theme in Cotton Nero A.1, see Loyn, A Wulfstan Manuscript, 49. See also Renée R. Trilling, “Sovereignty and Social Order: Archbishop Wulfstan and the Institutes of Polity,” in The Bishop
Reformed: Studies of Episcopal Power and Culture in the Central Middle Ages, ed. John S. Ott and
Anna Trumbore Jones (Aldershot, 2007), 58–85; Rabin, Political Writings of Wulfstan, esp. 37–38
and 61; Gates, “Preaching, Politics, and Episcopal Reform.”
68
Above, nn. 45–48.
69
Above, nn. 46–49.
70
Given the legalistic language of this passage, Wulfstan seems to apply the biblical prohibition
against negotiis secularibus—usually rendered “secular affairs”—speciﬁcally to lawsuits.
71
Compare concerns among Continental bishops about secular encroachment into ecclesiastical justice: see Hamilton, “Episcopal Justice,” 31‒33.
72
Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1042; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 251. On ecclesiastical judgments and jurisdiction, see also Cubitt, Anglo-Saxon Church Councils, 67‒74.
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His exemplis declaratur . ualde perniciosum esse regi uel principi: uel alicui ex laico ordine
disputare aut tractare de eclesiasticis iudiciis siue canonicis causis. . . . Alexander quoque
ad demetrium regem ait; Numquam auditum uel ab aliquo factum sit: ut presentibus episcopis laici disputent de canonicis uel aliis eclesiasticis ca[u]sis: sed omnium eclesiasticarum
rerum . episcopi curam habeant . et ea uelut deo contemplante dispensent.73
[By these examples, it is shown to be truly pernicious for the king or prince or anyone
from the laity to argue or negotiate ecclesiastical judgments or canonical lawsuits. . . .
Alexander also said to King Demetrius: may it never be heard of or done by anyone
that—with bishops present—the laity should dispute concerning canonical or other ecclesiastical lawsuits; but let bishops have care of all ecclesiastical affairs and let them
manage them as if God were observing.]

Wulfstan draws a sharp distinction between religious and secular justice in this
tract, restricting the personnel authorized to participate in each—an approach that
anticipates, to some extent, the post-Conquest division of criminal and ecclesiastical jurisdictions. In an early eleventh-century context, however, Wulfstan seems
to be following Ælfric in correcting the clergy’s overenthusiastic participation in
secular procedures. By advocating for strict boundaries in judicial administration,
Wulfstan is responding to the very problems Æthelred’s early laws—which separated secular from eccclesiastical procedure—appear to address.
Still, the system Wulfstan describes in De medicamento animarum does not ﬁt a
strict binary model of secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions. He identiﬁes two separate strands of religious justice in this passage, twice distinguishing ecclesiastical
(eclesiasticis) from canonical (canonicis) lawsuits.74 There is no explanation of
how these types of suits differ, and it is conceivable that the terms were employed
synonymously in this text, for rhetorical emphasis.75 Alternatively, it is possible that
these terms reﬂect precise legal categories—and that Wulfstan understood transgression somewhat differently than his later medieval counterparts, who construed
ecclesiastical and criminal justice as opposing, mutually exclusive categories. Certainly, Wulfstan advocated for separate judicial responses to religious and secular
offenses. Yet he also recognized an opposition between material wrongdoing, which
caused harm to earthly institutions and required material compensation to make
those institutions whole, and spiritual wrongdoing, which offended God and required penitential compensation to redeem offenders’ souls.
This distinction is articulated in the opening passage of De medicamento animarum, as part of a discussion of the clergy’s major responsibilities. The tract begins
with the following assertion: “Episcopi igitur et presbiteri pre omnibus sint semper
solliciti de cura ęclesiarum . et de medicamento animarum” (Bishops, therefore, and
priests should always, above everything, be concerned with the care of churches and
with the medicine of souls).76 The clergy’s twofold charge—to care for individual
Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1042; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 251‒52.
Above, n. 73.
75
For this type of parallelism in Wulfstan’s corpus, see Don W. Chapman, “Germanic Tradition and
Latin Learning in Wulfstan’s Echoic Compounds,” Journal of English and Germanic Philology 101
(2002): 1‒18, esp. 11‒12.
76
Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1042; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 251. The clause on the care of
churches (“de cura ęclesiarum . et”) was added in the margin in Wulfstan’s hand: see Ker, “Handwriting of Archbishop Wulfstan,” 324.
73
74
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790 Secular and Ecclesiastical Justice in Late Anglo-Saxon England
churches and to care for Christian souls—requires them to take responsibility both
for earthly institutions and spiritual affairs. This dual obligation is reiterated a few
lines later: “Status christianę religionis et ęclęsiasticę dignitatis ad eorum curam
maxime pertinet” (The state of the Christian religion and the state of the church’s
dignity rely entirely upon their [i.e., the clergy’s] care).77 Wulfstan distinguishes here
between cultivating faith and cultivating the church, again differentiating spiritual
from material concerns within the religious sphere. I propose that this spiritualmaterial conceptualization explains Wulfstan’s repeated reference to ecclesiastical
(eclesiasticis) and canonical (canonicis) suits. According to this schema, ecclesiastical suits would be those which dealt with violations against the rights and property
of the earthly church (ęclęsiasticę dignitatis), to be compensated with material penalties—such as ﬁnes paid to the bishop—in accordance with earthly law. Canonical
suits, by contrast, would be those which concerned sinful violations against God, to
be remedied with penance prescribed in accordance with canon law.78
Wulfstan’s royal legislation supports this interpretation and indicates that his approach to lawmaking was informed predominently by a spiritual-material opposition, rather than an ecclesiastical-criminal one. For example, VIII Æthelred 2–3 sets
the following compensation for anyone who commits homicide in a church:
And þæt is þonne ærest, þæt he his agenne wer Christe ⁊ þam cyninge gesylle ⁊ mid þam
hine sylfne inlagie to bote. . . . Þonne bete man þæt cyricgrið into ðære cyrcan be cynges
fullan mundbrice ⁊ þa mynsterclænsunge begyte, swa ðerto gebirige, ⁊ ægþer ge mægbote
ge manbote fullice gebete ⁊ wið God huru þingie georne.79
[First, that he pay his own wergild to the king and to Christ, and thereby place himself
within the law, so that he might offer compensation. . . . Then, for violating the church
peace, let him pay that church the full ﬁne for breaking the king’s peace; and let him take
responsibility for the church cleaning, as is appropriate; and let the offender fully compensate the family and lord of the dead man; and let him above all eagerly settle with God.]

In this case, the killer is required to pay monetary ﬁnes “to the king and to Christ,”
render material compensation to the violated church and his victim’s survivors, and
settle (þingie) with God directly. The payments to the king and survivors serve to
compensate the violation of royal protection and the injury done to the dead man,
both attested responses to homicide in Anglo-Saxon legislation. The remaining penalties are concerned with the fact that the killing took place in a church. The wergild
payment to Christ and the ﬁne rendered to the violated church should be underElliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1042; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 251.
This distinction anticipates the language of William’s writ, which distinguishes “canones et episcopales leges” (canon and episcopal laws); see above, n. 4, and also below, n. 87, for Wulfstan’s use of
the term canon. These categories are not always differentiated: in describing various types of penance
at the beginning of De medicamento animarum, for example, Wulfstan implies that these are all issued
by a bishop’s “iudicia ęclęsiastica” (ecclesiastical judgments). Compare a rather different distinction
between canon and ecclesiastical law in later periods: “canon law denotes in particular the law of the
‘Corpus Juris,’ including the regulations borrowed from Roman law; whereas ecclesiastical law refers
to all laws made by the ecclesiastical authorities as such, including those made after the compiling of
the ‘Corpus Juris’”: Auguste Boudinhon, “Canon Law,” The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 9 (New York,
1910), http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09056a.htm (last accessed 31 October 2017).
79
VIII Æthelred 2–3 (5 I Cnut 2.3–5).
77
78
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stood as material restoration for injury to the earthly institution: the former would
redeem the violation of Christ’s protection, and the latter would redeem the violation of consecrated space.80 Accordingly, both payments are governed by earthly
law, which establishes the correct amounts required for each element of material
harm—just as payments are calculated for the king and for the victim’s survivors.
By contrast, settlement with God would be achieved through an act of penance,
which would redeem the sin incurred by the killer’s actions.81 Nevertheless, although penance is mandated by royal law, no precise action is speciﬁed here. Unlike
material offenses to earthly entities, which were regulated and punished in the secular sphere, penance was rendered to God through the mediation of an ordained
confessor; its particulars were therefore outside the purview of royal regulation.
VIII Æthelred 2–3 offer some of the most detailed instructions in Wulfstan’s legislation and thus allow different categories of offense to be clearly distinguished.
These clauses are exceptional, though, for Wulfstan’s laws rarely address different
genres of punishment so precisely. Even though he distinguishes ecclesiastical
(eclesiasticis) from canonical (canonicis) suits in De medicamento animorum, these
categories are obscured in his vernacular legislation: there is no corresponding Old
English vocabulary for different forms of religious justice.82 However, Wulfstan
makes a broader distinction between categories of offense in his repeated injunction
that wrongdoing be remedied in both spheres, using the phrase for Gode ⁊ for
worolde.83 In standard translations of the Old English, this phrase is rendered “in
matters both religious and secular,” suggesting an opposition between criminal
and ecclesiastical jurisdictions.84 However, in the context of the present discussion,
80
The wergild payment to Christ might be rendered to the violated church, but it is also likely that
this ﬁne would be collected by the bishop, acting in Christ’s stead. The appropriate use of such payments is outlined in VI Æthelred 51, discussed below, n. 128.
81
Bosworth-Toller, s.v. “þingian,” section 2, glosses þingian as “to make terms, settle.” Wulfstan
repeatedly uses the term in penitential contexts, in which individuals are urged to settle or make
amends with God for their sins. Sometimes the act of settling with God (wið God þingian) is part
of a larger process of turning from sin: Bethurum, Homilies of Wulfstan, 275, no. 20 [ei]; Napier,
Wulfstan, 130 and 204, nos. xxvii and xlii. Elsewhere, the clergy is instructed to intervene (þingian)
with God to settle a penitent’s sins at the end of Lent or during a penitential fast: Bethurum, Homilies
of Wulfstan, 235, no. 14; Napier, Wulfstan, 171, no. xxxv. In other texts, individuals are exhorted to
settle with God directly as part of good Christian practice or as a condition of absolution: Cnut 1020
19; Roger Fowler, “A Late Old English Handbook for the Use of a Confessor,” Anglia 83 (1965): 1–
34, at 32. Wulfstan’s connection with this text is established by Fowler, “Handbook,” 6–12; Catherine
Cubitt, “Bishops, Priests and Penance in Late Anglo-Saxon England,” Early Medieval Europe 14
(2006): 41–63, at 53–54; Melanie Heyworth, “The ‘Late Old English Handbook for the Use of a Confessor’: Authorship and Connections,” Notes and Queries 252 (2007): 218–22. Arranging for the deﬁled church to be cleaned could also have been a penitential act: compare Fowler, “Handbook,” 29.
82
Compare the discussion of legal terminology in Hyams, “Crime and Tort,” 109–10, 115.
83
Versions of the phrase appear, for example, in V Æthelred 1.1, 4, 9.2, 33.1; VI Æthelred 2, 5.4, 8,
36, 39, 40.1, 53; VIII Æthelred 38; II Cnut 2, 11.1, 38.1; Edward and Guthrum 4. See also Sara M.
Pons-Sanz, “For Gode and for Worolde: Wulfstan’s Differentiation of the Divine and Worldly Realms
through Word-Formation Processes,” English Studies 85 (2004): 281–96.
84
For example, A. J. Robinson translates “in matters both religious and secular” (V Æthelred 1.1, 4,
33.1), “towards church and state” (VI Æthelred 36, 39), and “to God and to men” (II Cnut 38.1): see
Robinson, The Laws of the Kings of England from Edmund to Henry I, 2 vols. (Cambridge, UK,
1925), 1:79, 81, 89, 103, 195. Dorothy Whitelock translates “in both religious and secular concerns”
(V Æthelred 1, with similar phrasing at 4, 33.1), “in Church and state” (VIII Æthelred 38), “to God
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792 Secular and Ecclesiastical Justice in Late Anglo-Saxon England
a more accurate rendering would be “to God and to earthly authorities,” reﬂecting a
spiritual-material division. This reading is borne out in descriptions of how different compensation for Gode ⁊ for worolde ought to be determined. For instance,
VI Æthelred 50 decrees: “Se þe ahwar heonan forð rihte laga wyrde, Godes oþþon
manna, gebete hit georne, swa hwæþer swa hit gebyrige, swa mid godcundre bote
swa mid woroldcundre steore” (Henceforth, whoever violates the rightful law of
God or men anywhere: let him eagerly make amends in whatever way is ﬁtting,
whether with penance or with earthly punishment).85 In this formulation, violation
of God’s law requires spiritual compensation (godcundre bote), while violation of
human law requires earthly punishment (woroldcundre steore). This clause does
not distinguish civil from ecclesiastical penalties; instead, it differentiates penance
rendered to God from material punishment rendered to earthly powers. This point
is addressed in greater detail in II Cnut 38.2, which explains exactly how compensation should be determined in each sphere: “godcunde bote sece mann symle georne
be boctæcinge, ⁊ woruldcunde bote sece man be woruldlage” (let spiritual compensation [i.e., penance] always be undertaken eagerly, according to book teachings, and
let earthly compensation be undertaken according to earthly law).86 This clause again
divides penance (godcunde bote) and earthly compensation (woruldcunde bote) into
opposing categories, but it goes a step further than VI Æthelred 50 by codifying the
guiding principles behind each. Where earthly compensation is to be determined by
earthly law (woruldlage), penance is governed by “book teachings” (boctæcinge), or
canon law.87 Wulfstan is clear that separate processes must be used to determine
and implement these two types of penalties, but in articulating this logic, he grants
sins a distinctive status: they merit prohibition under secular law, but they can only
be remedied through ecclesiastical procedure.
Material violations against the church, by contrast, were given precise punishments in Wulfstan’s royal laws: such offenses required earthly compensation (woruldcunde bote) governed by earthly law (woruldlage) in order to maintain the health
of an earthly institution. This was the case in VIII Æthelred 2–3, which required an
individual who committed homicide in a church to render payment for violating
Christ’s protection and bear the cost of cleaning the deﬁled building.88 Wulfstan assigned monetary payments to bishops in his royal legislation, as well. If episcopal
protection (borh) was violated, for instance, bishops were granted compensation
and to men” (II Cnut 38.1): see Whitelock, English Historical Documents, vol. 1, c. 500–1042, 2nd ed.
(London, 1979), 442–46, 451, and 460, nos. 44, 46, and 49.
85
The phrase godcundre bot refers to penance elsewhere in Wulfstan’s corpus, notably V Æthelred
29; Edward and Guthrum prol. 2; Hadbot 2–8; Napier, Wulfstan, 275, no. li. Compare also II Edmund 4.
86
II Cnut 38.2.
87
The DOE glosses boctalu as “instruction or teaching contained in books (of penance or ecclesiastical law)”; the term appears uniquely in II Cnut 38.2. Elsewhere in his corpus, Wulfstan emphasizes
that every bishop should have a book of canons (canonboc) and that penances should be assigned according to canonical decrees (æfter canon dome): see Jost, Institutes of Polity, 211, 172; Fowler,
“Handbook,” 27–28. Compare Ælfric’s Old English letter to Wulfstan: “Canones sind gecwedene
rihte regulas, þe us gerihtlæcað” (Correct rules, which direct us, are called “canons”): Ælfric of Eynsham, Letter II.152, ed. Fehr, 124–25. See also DOE, s.v. “canondom,” glossed as “book of canons,
collection of ecclesiastical laws.”
88
Above, n. 79.
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payments comparable to those awarded to high-ranking laymen.89 Fines for committing perjury under oath, attacking a clergyman, and failing to pay ecclesiastical
dues were to be split between the local lord and bishop; moreover, anyone who
wounded another while resisting tithe collectors was to render an additional ﬁne
to the king and pay the bishop to reedeem his hand from amputation.90 In these cases,
bishops were construed as injured parties entitled to recompense under royal law,
just like their lay counterparts. Elsewhere in his royal law codes, Wulfstan decrees
that speciﬁc offenses be subject to episcopal rather than secular judgment.91 This
was the case in instances in which clergy committed offenses normally governed
by secular law: a clergyman (gehadod man) who committed a capital crime was
to be captured and “healde to bisceopes dome” (held for the bishop’s judgment);
a priest (mæssepreost) who gave false witness, perjured himself, or was an accomplice to thieves was to be removed from his ofﬁce “buton he wið God ⁊ wið men þe
deoplicor gebete, fullice swa biscop him tæce” (unless he compensate deeply to God
and to men, entirely as the bishop instructs him).92 Similar instructions were given
concerning laypeople who failed to refute charges of sexual misconduct or illicit
killing (morð). If a married man kept a concubine, he was to be excluded from communion until he compensated “swa bisceop him tæce” (as the bishop instructs him);
if a married woman could not refute an accusation of adultery, “bisceop þonne
wealde ⁊ stiðlice deme” (the bishop shall have control and judge severely); and if
a person failed to clear himself of a morð charge, “deme se bisceop” (the bishop shall
judge).93 These ﬁnal two offenses were normally subject to secular penalties, but
the failure to prove innocence—presumably through the oath or ordeal, procedures
that invoked God’s judgment and were overseen by clergy—made the offense a spiritual matter, which placed a perpetrator, under royal law, within the bishop’s jurisdiction.94
89
II Cnut 58.1–2 set these ﬁnes at three pounds for archbishops or æthelings, and two pounds for
bishops or ealdormen.
90
For perjury, see II Cnut 36; for binding or beating the clergy, see II Cnut 42; for ecclesiastical dues,
see VIII Æthelred 7–8 (5 I Cnut 8.2), I Cnut 9–10.1, and II Cnut 48.1.
91
Compare Helmholz, Oxford History of the Laws of England, 1:56–57.
92
II Cnut 43 and VIII Æthelred 27 (5 I Cnut 5.3, omit “fullice”).
93
II Cnut 54.1 (the preceding clause 54 on adultery requires compensation “wið God ⁊ wið men,”
and this may be implicit in 54.1 as well); II Cnut 53.1; II Cnut 56.1. The precise meaning of morð is
debated: see especially Bruce R. O’Brien, “From Morðor to Murdrum: The Preconquest Origin and
Norman Revival of the Murder Fine,” Speculum 71/2 (1996): 321–57, at 342–49; Stefan Jurasinski,
“‘Reddatur parentibus’: The Vengeance of the Family in Cnut’s Homicide Legislation,” Law and History Review 20 (2002): 157–80, at 161–62, 170–80; Wormald, Making of English Law, 363, 367;
Tomas Lambert, “Protection, Feud, and Royal Power: Violence and Its Regulation in English Law,
c. 850–c. 1250” (PhD diss., Durham University, 2009), available online at http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2/
(last accessed 31 October 2017), 59–60. Compare similar procedures in Edward and Guthrum 4 on incest and 4.2 on clerical misconduct.
94
The secular consequences for each offense are listed in the preceding clauses: II Cnut 53 decrees
that a woman whose adultery becomes known (“open weorðe”) will forfeit her property and lose her
nose and ears; II Cnut 56 requires a man responsible for a killing that is deemed murder (“open morð
weorð”) to be surrendered to his victim’s family. Procedures for addressing charges through the oath
or ordeal are provided in I Æthelred 1–1.14 and II Cnut 30–30.9. The ecclesiastical setting of the ordeal and invocations to God in judicial oaths are attested in Ordal and Swerian: see Liebermann,
Gesetze, 1:386–87, 396–99; the bishop’s role is explicated in Episcopus 5.
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794 Secular and Ecclesiastical Justice in Late Anglo-Saxon England
In Wulfstan’s legislation, material compensation or judgment was assigned to the
bishop in cases that diminished the church’s material well-being (refusal to pay
tithes, harm to the clergy) or its integrity as an earthly institution (clerical crime,
violation of episcopal protection, violation of marriage vows, testing God’s judgment). These categories of offense would come to be regulated by ecclesiastical
courts in the later medieval period, but in the early eleventh century, I contend, they
were governed by royal law because of their status as material violations against the
earthly church.95 Nevertheless, Wulfstan is clear in De medicamento animarum that
such “ecclesiastical” cases be overseen exclusively by bishops, just like the “canonical” suits that dealt with moral offenses. The implications of this mandate are
thorny. It is conceivable that in “ecclesiastical” cases concerned with material violations against the earthly church, bishops would be responsible for trying or judging individuals who had broken secular law. This may be precisely the type of activity that Ælfric cautioned against in his discussions of clerical participation in secular
justice. Wulfstan presents the judicial defense of the earthly church as a vital episcopal obligation, yet it is likely that “ecclesiastical” cases functioned—and appeared
to outside observers—much like secular ones did.
Ecclesiastical and Secular Collaboration
The overlap between religious and secular cases is reinforced in De medicamento
animarum by the frequent use of judicial terminology. The text is concerned with
those who issue judgments (iudiciis), debate and argue pleas (disputare), and are involved in lawsuits (causis, negotiis). Such legalistic vocabulary is rare in Wulfstan’s
writings, but here it is not appropriated directly from any Latin source. Rather, De
medicamento animarum draws from canons dispersed across different collections,
adapting a small selection of material concerned with judgments and the role of
bishops; much of the legal language appears to be Wulfstan’s own addition.96 In
some cases, he signiﬁcantly alters the context of his sources to encompass judicial
matters. When instructing clergymen to avoid earthly engagements, for instance,
Wulfstan omits the original canon’s exhortation to concentrate on pastoral duties
and not domestic affairs; instead, he adds a prohibition against episcopal participation in secular justice.97 Elsewhere, he expands upon a canon excluding bishops
95
Morris, “William I and the Church Courts,” 460–61; Helmholz, Oxford History of the Laws of
England, 1:110 and 139–44. See also Cubitt’s suggestion that disputes concerning ecclesiastical property were subject to secular rather than ecclesiastical jurisdiction from the ninth century: “Bishops and
Councils,” 152.
96
The compiled nature of Cotton Nero A.i is discussed by Loyn, A Wulfstan Manuscript, esp. 46–
53; Cross and Hamer, Wulfstan’s Canon Law, 23–30. Some of this judicial language may have been
adopted from the Collectio canonum Hibernensis, which employs legalistic vocabulary in a section titled “De judicio”: the text is edited by Hermann Wasserschleben, Die irische Kanonensammlung (Leipzig, 1885), with this section (book 21) at 62–73. For the Collectio Hibernensis as a source for
Wulfstanian texts, see Cross and Hamer, Wulfstan’s Canon Law, 33–34; Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 146–47. For its broader inﬂuence in tenth- and eleventh-century England, see Shannon Ambrose, “The Collectio canonum Hibernensis and the Literature of the Anglo-Saxon Benedictine Reform,” Viator 36 (2005): 107–18. See also nn. 97–98, below.
97
This passage of De medicamento animarum (quoted above, p. 15) is expanded from a clause in
the Collectio canonum Hibernensis; the same clause was also adapted in Wulfstan’s canon law collec-
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Secular and Ecclesiastical Justice in Late Anglo-Saxon England 795
from secular judicial deliberation, changing its meaning to forbid laymen from participating in canonical or ecclesiastical suits.98 Through such revisions—which still
bore the canonical authority of their sources—Wulfstan engaged the vocabulary of
secular justice in order to delineate exclusive jurisdictions for lay and religious authorities.99 While secular and ecclesiastical suits might employ similar procedures
and draw on a common legal terminology, according to his formulation, they were
to be clearly distinguished by their subject matter and personnel.100
Why, then, did Wulfstan emphasize collaborative justice so heavily in his laws?
If there needed to be a ﬁrm separation of secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions,
what was the beneﬁt of the uniﬁed assemblies he advocated in VIII Æthelred and
II Cnut? I propose that for Wulfstan, collaboration was most valuable when it
came time to sentence offenders and enforce their punishments. While he forbade
secular authorities to issue ecclesiastical judgments or assign penance, Wulfstan
did expect the clergy to participate in sentencing in secular cases. In his tract Episcopus, for instance, he instructs, “Sculon bisceopas mid worulddeman domas
dihtan, þæt hi ne geþaﬁan, gyf his waldan magan, þæt ðær ænig unriht up aspringe”
(Bishops must establish sentences with secular judges, so that they do not allow any

tion (also known as the Collectio Wigorniensis or the Excerptiones pseudo-Ecgberhti). The canon in
the Collectio Hibernensis reads as follows (with language adapted in De medicamento animarum in
italics): “ut episcopus nullam rei familiaris curam ad se revocet, sed ut lectioni et orationi et verbi
Dei predicationi tantum vacet”; Collectio Hibernensis 1.10.b, ed. Wasserschleben, Die irische Kanonensammlung, 7. This clause is expanded in Wulfstan’s canon law collection but largely retains
the focus and vocabulary of its source, as follows (with language adapted in De medicamento animarum in italics): “Et in unica ecclesia, episcopus nullam rei familiaris curam ad se reuocet, sed lectioni
et orationi et uerbi Dei predicationi tantum uacet, et uilem suppellectilem ac uictum pauperem habeat,
et dignitatis suę auctoritatem ﬁde et per uite meritum querat, et cum apostolis pernuriam patienter
sustineat”: Cross and Hamer, Wulfstan’s Canon Law, 73, A.17; and compare 125, at B.36. In De
medicamento animarum, Wulfstan adapts these clauses as “Episcopi quoque nullatenus secularibus
iudiciis. aut negotiis: curis . uel causis . se inportune ocupent sed eclesiasticis; Lectioni itaque et orationi
et uerbi dei predicatio[ni] instanter uacent”: Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1042; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe
Ælfrics, 252; and see the full quotation above, 15 and n. 65.
98
This clause (quoted and discussed above, 16 and n. 73) is also adapted from the Collectio
Hibernensis, which reads as follows (with language adapted in De medicamento animarum in italics):
“Si episcopus vel scriba presentes sint, statuant judicium, quia inlicitum est laicis disputare presentibus
episcopis aut scribis aut sanctis. Inde Alexander episcopus Hierusalem ad Demetrium regem Grecorum
ait: Numquam auditum nec ab aliquo factum sit, ut presentibus episcopis laici disputent”; Collectio
Hibernensis 21.28, ed. Wasserschleben, 72. De medicamento animarum reads, “Alexander quoque
ad demetrium regem ait; Numquam auditum uel ab aliquo factum sit: ut presentibus episcopis laici
disputent de canonicis uel aliis eclesiasticis ca[u]sis: sed omnium eclesiasticarum rerum . episcopi curam
habeant . et ea uelut deo contemplante dispensent”: Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1042; Fehr,
Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 252.
99
For canonical authority, see Cross and Hamer, Wulfstan’s Canon Law, 30; Austin, “Jurisprudence in the Service of Pastoral Care,” 939–43.
100
Ecclesiastical courts overseen by bishops were established in late antiquity: see, for example, John
C. Lamoreaux, “Episcopal Courts in Late Antiquity,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 3 (1995):
143–67; Noel E. Lenski, “Evidence for the audientia episcopalis in the New Letters of Augustine,”
in Law, Society, and Authority in Late Antiquity, ed. Ralph. W. Mathisen (Oxford, 2001), 83–97;
Cubitt, Anglo-Saxon Church Councils, 73–74. The clauses from Collectio Hibernensis cited above
(nn. 97–98) are attributed to late antique authorities: 2.10.b is listed as a canon of the Council of Carthage, and 21.28 is attributed to Gregory of Nazianzus.
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796 Secular and Ecclesiastical Justice in Late Anglo-Saxon England
injustice to spring up, if it is within their power).101 Likewise, in Cnut 1020, secular
reeves are enjoined to “æghwær min folc rihtlice healdan ⁊ rihte domas deman be
ðæra scira biscopa gewitnesse ⁊ swylce mildheortnesse þæron don, swylce þære
scire biscope riht þince” (govern my people justly everywhere, and judge just sentences with the shire bishops’ advice, and issue them with as much mercy as the shire
bishop thinks just).102 In these clauses, bishops are not told to argue cases or issue
decisions in secular suits; rather, they are required to consult with lay authorities
to establish appropriate sentences.103 A driving principle of Wulfstan’s legislation
was the need for merciful penalties, which punished an offender’s earthly violation
yet did not hinder his eventual salvation. Wulfstan departed from earlier Anglo-Saxon
law by issuing predominently nonlethal (friðlice) sentences that enabled offenders to
live and repent of their sins, but even when death sentences were unavoidable, he
demonstrated concern for the souls of the condemned: he required that ﬁnal confession be offered to convicts before their execution, and he moved away from decadesold laws that prohibited burying dead criminals in consecrated ground.104 In this
context, Wulfstan’s call for collaborative sentencing offers a further opportunity to
ensure spiritual health—not only for the offender, but for the judge who might endanger his own soul through an overly harsh penalty.105 The bishop’s job in secular
sentencing was to temper earthly punishments and bring them in line with Christian
priorities.
In religious cases, by contrast, Wulfstan was concerned with collaboration in enforcement, rather than in sentencing. His main focus in De medicamento animarum
is penance, the medicine of souls for which the tract is titled. The obligations of the
clergy are clear: “Conﬁtentibus quoque ac penitentibus omnimodo sucurrant: et indifferenter penitentię leges petentibus [sic] iniungant” (They should help those who
confess, and also penitents, in every way, and objectively impose upon penitents the
laws of penance).106 Wulfstan then describes the range of appropriate penances for
sinners. These include devotional activities, like prayers and vigils, but there are also
options that affect the penitent materially and physically, including almsgiving, fast101

Episcopus 9.
Cnut 1020 11. Cnut issued this text while abroad, where it was (presumably) composed without
Wulfstan’s direct inﬂuence; however, the text is preserved uniquely in Wulfstan’s own copy in the York
Gospels and, as written, reﬂects the archbishop’s priorities: see Wormald, Making of English Law,
347.
103
Dorothy Whitelock suggests that the phrase domas dihtan in Episcopus 9 “probably refers to the
sentences imposed in the courts”: see Dorothy Whitelock, Martin Brett, and Cristopher N. L. Brooke,
eds., Councils and Synods, with Other Documents Relating to the English Church, vol. 1, A.D. 871–
1066 (New York, 1981), 420 n. 4; and compare DOE, s.v. “dom,” section 1.a.vii. See also Rabin, Political Writings of Wulfstan, 63.
104
Maraﬁoti, “Punishing Bodies,” 50–57. I examine Wulfstan’s approach to unconsecrated burial in
greater depth elsewhere: Nicole Maraﬁoti, “Unconsecrated Burial and Excommunication in AngloSaxon England: A Reassessment,” Traditio (forthcoming).
105
I discuss earlier examples of this logic in “Earthly Justice and Spiritual Consequences: Judging
and Punishing in the Old English Consolation of Philosophy,” in Gates and Maraﬁoti, Capital and
Corporal Punishment, 113–30. Compare the closing line of De medicamento animarum, which has
bishops “assiduis precibus exorantes . diuine maiestatis clementiam pro salute omnium” (lifting up assiduous prayers to the mercy of the divine majesty, for the health of all): Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1043; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 253.
106
Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1042; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 251.
102
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Secular and Ecclesiastical Justice in Late Anglo-Saxon England 797
ing, and “diuersis corporum castigationibus” (various bodily castigations).107 Although the list is followed by the assertion that “episcoporum enim est omnia
iudicia ęclęsiastica rite disponere” (it is right that bishops set all ecclesiastical judgments),108 the discussion of penances—like other sections of this tract—is marked
by legal and judicial rhetoric that would be appropriate in a secular context. Bishops
must impose the laws (leges iniungant) of penance without bias (indifferenter), following correct (rite) procedure when they set judgments (iudicia disponere). This
terminology mirrors the language applied to earthly justice elsewhere in the text,
thus creating a shared vocabulary for secular and penitential sentencing. In addition, this diction reinforces the fact that penance was a penalty to be administered
from above, by a higher earthly authority, just like punishments for mundane offenses. Accordingly, penitential sentences needed as much enforcement as secular
ones. Wulfstan explains, “Quoniam sunt nonnulli qui paruipendunt diuinam doctrinam: ideo oportet eos per seculares potentię disciplinam . a tam praua consuetudine . cohercere et corrigere” (Because there are some who give little weight to divine instruction, it is therefore ﬁtting for them to be coerced and corrected from such
perverse custom through the discipline of secular power).109 Wulfstan develops this
point in another Latin text preserved as part of his “commonplace book,” in a discussion of convicted sinners who persist in their misdeeds: “Necesse est ut inuiti
pęnas pęnitentię exsoluant . ne animę pro quibus dominus passus est . in ęterna pęna
dispereant. . . . Melius est enim cuique ut coactus ad regnum . quam sponte ad supplicium perueniat sempiternum” (It is necessary that they involuntarily pay the penalty of penance, lest the souls for which the Lord suffered perish in eternal punishment. . . . For it is better for anyone to come coerced to the king than voluntarily to
eternal suffering).110 In this formulation, it was collaboration with lay authorities—
in this case the king and, presumaby, royal representatives capable of forcing compliance—that gave religious sentences their weight and ensured that penances
would be completed. This may have been a particularly pressing issue when “bodily
castigations” were prescribed, but Wulfstan was also concerned that lesser penances could too easily be ignored.111 In De medicamento animarum, he urges that
secular pressure be applied to those “qui ﬁngunt et dicunt . se habere humilitatem
in christo: sed despiciunt obedientiam mandatorum eius . spernuntque predicatores
salutis: et propterea mentiuntur . quia non sunt humiles: sed superbi” (who pretend
and say that they have humility in Christ but despise obedience to his commands
and spurn salviﬁc warnings. And they lie about these things because they are not
Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1042; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 251.
Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1042; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 251. See also above, n. 64.
109
Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1043; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 252. In another of Wulfstan’s
discourses on penance, this language is applied to individuals who commit incest and homicide: “quos
oportet per sęcularis potentię disciplinam a tam praua consuetudine cohercere . qui per salutifera
sacerdotum monita noluerint reuocare” (it is ﬁtting for them to be coerced from such perverse custom
through the discipline of secular powers, those who did not wish to return through the salviﬁc admonitions of priests): Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1100; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 245. Compare
also Edward and Guthrum prol. 2.
110
Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1100; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 245. This passage appears in
Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, MS 190.
111
Above, n. 107.
107
108
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798 Secular and Ecclesiastical Justice in Late Anglo-Saxon England
humble but proud).112 This critique seems especially applicable to individuals who
were assigned less conspicuous acts of penance, such as prayer or almsgiving; the absence of bodily mortiﬁcation, by comparison, might be considerably more difﬁcult to
conceal. If Wulfstan’s objective was full adherence to Christian law, then even small
violations, like evading modest penances, could damage the overall health of the
kingdom. The threat of retribution from lay authorities would presumably lead to
greater compliance with spiritual directives, thereby securing divine approval. Moreover, reliable secular enforcement would give ecclesiastical justice greater legitimacy,
conﬁrming that spiritual atonement was on a par with secular punishments. Although the ignorant—those who “give little weight to divine instruction”—might
be unable to see the connection beween individual piety and national prosperity,
pressure from earthly magnates could secure their compliance.113 Even if some individuals’ understanding of the spiritual beneﬁts was imperfect, or their obedience to
the bishop’s instructions was grudging, they would nevertheless be compelled to perform the penance their souls required in order to avoid further material punishment.
A ﬁnal question to consider is who exactly would enact this policy of enforcement. Perhaps the most practical solution was to entrust this responsibility to people
who normally enforced secular sentences: the king, local magnates, and their representatives. In De medicamento animarum, though, Wulfstan offered another solution: “episcopi curam animarum indesinenter habeant: et nequaquam seculares
curas assumant: sed habeant sub se aduocatos . et prepositos: qui populares causas
exerceant et sint semper parati ad resistendam rebellium pertinacium” (bishops
should constantly have care of souls and by no means assume secular responsibilities; but they should have advocates and surrogates under them, who can enforce
the people’s suits and always be prepared for the resistance of stubborn rebels).114
In other words, a bishop is not permitted to enforce judicial sentences himself,
but he may employ and supervise underlings who can legitimately act on his behalf
in the secular sphere. This is another instance where Wulfstan diverged from his
sources. The original canons direct the ﬁrst part of this rule to bishops, priests,
and deacons alike, requiring deposition for any who should participate in secular
affairs.115 Wulfstan’s adaptation omits all mention of deposition, addresses this instruction exclusively to bishops, and conceives an administrative hierarchy to represent episcopal interests. Given Wulfstan’s formulation, it is not impossible that
these surrogates would include lower orders of clergy; it is only bishops who are
prohibited from “secular responsibilities.” Yet this instruction could also be directed toward members of the laity, who might act on the bishop’s behalf when direct episcopal participation was inappropriate. Such an arrangement is implicit in

Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1043; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 252.
Above, n. 109.
114
Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1043; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 252.
115
The source canon from the Collectio Hibernensis reads as follows (with language adapted in De
medicamento animarum in italics): “Episcopus aut prespiter aut diaconus nequaquam saeculares curas
adsumant, sin aliter, deponatur”; Collectio Hibernensis 2.27, ed. Wasserschleben, 20. This canon is
also adapted as follows in Wulfstan’s canon law collection (with language adapted in De medicamento
animarum in italics): “Episcopus aut presbiter uel diaconus nequaquam seculares curas adsumat; sin
aliter, deponatur”; Cross and Hamer, Wulfstan’s Canon Law, 73, A.17; and compare 125, B.37.
112
113
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Wulfstan’s legislation, in clauses delineating how tithes should be collected from unwilling individuals:
Gif hwa teoþunge rihtlice gelæstan nelle, þonne fare to þæs cyninges gerefa ⁊ þæs mynstres
mæssepreost—oððe þæs landrican ⁊ þæs biscopes gerefa—⁊ niman unþances ðone teoðan
dæl to ðam mynstre, þe hit to gebirige, ⁊ tæcan him to ðam nigoðan dæl; ⁊ todæle man ða
eahta dælas on twa ⁊ fo se landhlaford to healfum, to healfum se biscop, si hit cyninges
man, sy hit þegnes.116
[If anyone does not wish to justly render his tithe, then let the king’s reeve and the Mass
priest of the minster go to him—or the landowner and the bishop’s reeve—and let them
take the tenth part to the minster without his consent, and assign to him the ninth part,
and divide the eight remaining parts in two, and let the landlord take half and the bishop
take half, whether the offender be the king’s man or a thegn’s.]

In this scenario, the overdue tithe and forfeited property would be collected by some
combination of secular and ecclesiastical authorities, including the bishop’s reeve—
presumably a layman entrusted with protecting episcopal property and overseeing
the church’s earthly affairs on the bishop’s behalf.117 These individuals seem exactly
the type of “advocates and surrogates” Wulfstan envisioned in De medicamento
animarum, empowered to compel “stubborn rebels” to submit to ecclesiastical
rules.118 Even if bishops were required to distance themselves from the administration of earthly justice and the implementation of material punishments, Wulfstan
was clear that their interests needed to be robustly defended by episcopal delegates
and secular allies.
Conclusions
Much of De medicamento animarum is compiled from materials that appear
elsewhere in Wulfstan’s “commonplace book,” and there is considerable thematic
overlap with his other writings.119 Yet this text represents his clearest discussion of
how the clergy—and especially bishops—ought to participate in judicial matters.
Fundamentally, Wulfstan’s approach was in line with Ælfric’s advice: clergy were
not to litigate or issue judgments in secular cases because such activity ran counter
to their pastoral mission. However, Wulfstan took a more nuanced view of the
realities of earthly justice. Rather than requiring clergy to absent themselves in order to maintain their spiritual purity, as Ælfric advocated, Wulfstan recognized a
number of circumstances in which the clergy were obliged to participate in secular
affairs in order to defend the interests of the earthly church. Such work should be
understood as acts of devotion, according to his reasoning, for De medicamento
animarum instructs bishops to administer their sees “uelut deo contemplante” (as
116

VIII Æthelred 8 (5 I Cnut 8.2). Compare also II Edgar 3.1.
The role of the bishop’s reeve in this clause is discussed by Chelsea Shields-Más, “The Reeve in
Late Anglo-Saxon England” (PhD diss., University of York, 2013), available online at http://etheses
.whiterose.ac.uk/5534/ (last accessed 31 October 2017), 105–7.
118
Above, n. 114. For a discussion of advocates in a monastic context, see Charles West, “Monks,
Aristocrats and Justice: Twelfth-Century Monastic Advocacy in a European Perspective,” Speculum
92/2 (2017): 372–404.
119
See especially the sources provided by Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1043.
117
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800 Secular and Ecclesiastical Justice in Late Anglo-Saxon England
if God were observing).120 Moreover, where Ælfric focused on keeping the clergy out
of secular justice, Wulfstan was just as committed to keeping the laity out of church
business. He cited the distance between orders (distantia est ordinum) to make this
point, presumably drawing on Ælfric’s discourse on the three orders of society, which
preceded the discussion of secular justice in his pastoral letter to Wulfstan.121 For
Ælfric, these orders—those who work, ﬁght, and pray—were separate: the clergy’s
role was “bellare uiriliter contra spiritalia nequitia” (to ﬁght strongly against spiritual iniquity), and anyone who undertook secular obligations after ordination “erit
apostata” (would be an apostate).122 The logic of De medicamento animarum is
driven by principles of ecclesiastical autonomy, more than by religious purity, but the
differentiation of ecclesiastical and secular jurisdictions that Wulfstan envisioned was
consistent with Ælfric’s model.
Wulfstan diverges from Ælfric, however, in his views concerning the appropriate relationship between orders. Ælfric acknowledges interdependence between the
three orders—if one fails, the others cannot endure—but ﬁrmly delineates each sphere
from the others, construing their obligations as mutually exclusive.123 Wulfstan echoes
the language of interdependence in his own discussion of the three orders in his Institutes of Polity, and like Ælfric, he situates this discourse immediately before remarks
about earthly justice.124 The kingdom will thrive, according to Wulfstan, if the orders
are strengthened
mid wislicre Godes lare, and mid rihtlicre woruldlage: þæt wyrð þam þeodscype to langsuman ræde. And soð is, þæt ic secge: awacie se cristendom, sona scylfð se cynedom; and
arære man unlaga ahwar on lande oððe unsida luﬁge ahwar to swiðe, þæt cymð þære
Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1042; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 251–52. See above, n. 73.
Elliot, “Canon Law Collections,” 1042–43; Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 252; and see above, 15 and
n. 65, for the full quotation. Ælfric’s discussion of the orders in his Latin letter to Wulfstan is in Ælfric of
Eynsham, Letter 2a.14, ed. Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 225–26. Compare also Ælfric’s discussion of
the three orders in his treatise on the Old and New Testaments, which is followed immediately by a
statement concerning earthly justice: he remarks that “se rihtwisa God lufað rihte domas” (righteous
God loves just judgments) and cautions against judicial corruption, stating that “se þe Godes þegen
bið, sceolde deman rihtlice butan ælcum medsceatte mid soðfæstnysse” (anyone who would be God’s
thegn must judge justly, with adherence to the truth, without any payment): S.J. Crawford, ed., The
Old English Version of the Heptateuch, Early English Text Society, o.s., 160 (London, 1922), 72. This
theme is discussed by Timothy E. Powell, “The ‘Three Orders’ of Society in Anglo-Saxon England,”
Anglo-Saxon England 23 (1994): 103–32, at 109–15; Wormald, Making of English Law, 458–63.
122
Fehr, Hirtenbriefe Ælfrics, 225. Compare also Ælfric’s descriptions of the Three Orders in Walter
Skeat, Ælfric’s Lives of Saints: Being a Set of Sermons on Saints’ Days Formerly Observed by the English Church, 2 vols., Early English Text Society, o.s., 76, 82, 94, 114 (London, 1881–1900), 2:120–
22.
123
Ælfric uses the image of a three-legged stool (stol) in his discussion of interdependence: Crawford,
Heptateuch, 71–72; Powell, “Three Orders,” 114–15. Wulfstan adapts Ælfric’s imagery, referring instead to a throne, or “king stool” (cynestol): Jost, Institutes of Polity, 55–57; and below, n. 125.
124
Of Ælfric’s three references to the orders, two are followed directly by admonitions concerning
earthly justice; see above, n. 121. The third, appended to his homily on the book of Maccabees in
Skeat’s edition, is followed by an account of clergy being forced into battle by Julian the Apostate
or else imprisoned; Ælfric then reminds his contemporaries that the clergy must not engage in earthly
battles. This passage is framed in terms of military activity, but Ælfric’s phrasing is similar to the discussion of earthly justice in his letter to Wulfstan: monks must avoid physical ﬁghting like their saintly
predecessors, who “noldon ænne fugel acwellan” (did not wish even to kill a bird): Skeat, Lives of
Saints, 2:124.
120
121
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þeode eall to unþearfe. Ac do man, swa hit þearf is, alecge man unriht and rære up Godes
riht.
[with God’s wise teachings and with just earthly law; that will guide the nation for a long
time. And it is true what I say: if Christianity weakens, the kingdom will quickly be shaken;
and if anyone raise up injustice anywhere in the land or love bad customs too much, then
the nation will all come to harm. But let what is necessary be done: let injustice be set aside
and God’s justice be raised up.125]

Ordering society correctly—that is, in accordance with God’s will—requires
good earthly law, enforced through the righteous exercise of justice; the juxtaposition of this point with an explication of the three orders in both authors’ writings
conﬁrms how integrally these ideas were connected. Still, Wulfstan did not adopt
Ælfric’s ideas about exclusivity.126 Instead, he depicted the cultivation of piety
and justice as a shared responsibily in De medicamento animarum, despite the distance (distantia) that otherwise separated the orders. This difference of opinion may
be attributed to the environments in which these authors were working. Writing in
a monastic context, Ælfric apparently viewed the issue of clerical participation in
the secular world in black-and-white terms, whereas Wulfstan’s own episcopal responsibilities required him to grapple with a sizable grey area. As the archbishop’s
discussions of earthly justice reveal, there was rarely a sharp divide between secular
and ecclesiastical interests. Wulfstan decreed that mundane offenses be compensated
for Gode ⁊ for worolde, with penances imposed alongside material penalties to redeem the moral failings that inspired misbehavior. Accordingly, if all crimes were
rooted in sin, violations of royal law must also be a religious matter. By this logic,
most occasions for earthly justice would have required some degree of clerical intervention. Although it was inappropriate for a bishop to litigate or decide a secular suit
that had no direct bearing on ecclesiastical matters, it was necessary that he intervene
with lay authorities to save the souls involved. Likewise, while the clergy were supposed to avoid secular business whenever possible, they were obliged to defend the
rights, property, and integrity of the earthly church. I suggest that Wulfstan regarded
such action as an extension of pastoral duties: in addition to saving individual souls,
it was incumbent upon the clergy to ensure that the church had sufﬁcient protection
and resources to fulﬁll its mission. While such efforts might be mistaken for secular
activity by an outside observer like Ælfric, Wulfstan recognized the complexity of
earthly justice and delineated an acceptable role for the clergy within established legal
processes.
To conclude this discussion, I would like to return to the idea of dual penalties—
the earthly punishments “common to Christ and the king,” whose decline Wulfstan
lamented in VIII Æthelred 38.127 This phrase suggests some degree of overlap between penitential and material compensation, but it is unclear how fully these categories converged: could a single penalty serve simultaneously as punishment and
penance? Even though his royal laws never prescribe speciﬁc penances, Wulfstan

Jost, Institutes of Polity, 57–58. See also Powell, “Three Orders,” 115–16.
Above, n. 121. On collective responsibility for wrongdoing and its remedies, see Cubitt, “Individual and Collective Sinning,” 63–66.
127
Above, n. 33.
125
126
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802 Secular and Ecclesiastical Justice in Late Anglo-Saxon England
seems to have imagined that such a scenario was possible in cases of violation
against the church. In VI Æthelred 51, he provided a list of appropriate uses for
funds acquired by ecclesiastical authorities in cases where “for godbotan feohbot
ariseð, swa swa wise woroldwitan to steora gesettan” (money compensation is rendered as penance, as wise earthly counselors established as punishment): such revenue was to be used only to maintain the church and further its mission, “næfre to
woroldlican idelan gelengan, ac for woroldsteoran to godcundan neodan” (never to
advance worldly vanity, but for a secular punishment to advance spiritual needs).128
Earthly punishment and religious penance are both satisﬁed with a common penalty, in this formulation.129 A similar conﬂation is evident in clauses that call for payments to the bishop for violations against the earthly church. For instance, I Cnut 9
and 10 require monetary ﬁnes to the bishop if religious dues are not paid promptly;
II Cnut 42 requires “altar compensation” (weofodbote) to be rendered to the bishop
by anyone who abuses a clergyman; and II Cnut 58 requires monetary payment to
the bishop for violations of his protection. It is never stated whether such penalties
were meant to compensate material harm or spiritual corruption, but when read
alongside the instructions in VI Æthelred 51, it is possible that they were intended
to do both.130
Nevertheless, while the payment of certain secular ﬁnes may have been understood to provide a spiritual beneﬁt, it is improbable that such payments fulﬁlled
all the penitential obligations required by Wulfstan’s laws. In some circumstances,
there may have been an expectation that penance would be rendered in a separate
process, distinct from the payment of ﬁnes prescribed in royal legislation.131 It could
be that the law codes’ side-by-side instructions for punishment and penance were
intended for emphasis, in instances of grave malfeasance in both the secular and
spiritual spheres (committing homicide in a church, for example). For lesser offenses, by contrast, the penalties mandated by royal law may have created opportunites for additional penitential sentences to be issued. Perhaps offenders were expected to render ecclesiastical ﬁnes during the judicial assemblies at which their
cases were heard, with the bishop empowered to prounounce a separate penitential
sentence as he accepted payment. Or perhaps offenders were instructed to deliver
their ﬁnes at a later date to a church, where they would be required to undertake

128
VI Æthelred 51. With the bishop’s approval, the money was to pay for prayer, care for the poor,
church repairs, teaching, supporting the clergy, books, bells, and religious vestments. These instructions apply to a variety of ﬁnes—wergild, halsfange, lahslite—and to large and small payments alike.
129
For money or property rendered as penance, see, for instance, Fowler, “Handbook,” 29–30.
130
Monetary payments are often regarded as commutations of penance by modern scholars. However, in his laws Wulfstan does not frame monetary payments as alternatives to or replacements for
other forms of penance, and in the Old English Handbook he suggests that ﬁnancial offering is one
of the various forms (“mistlice wisan”) penance could take: Fowler, “Handbook,” 29. For discussions
of commutation, see, for example, Fowler, “Handbook,” 14; Oakley, English Penitential Discipline,
88–103; Barlow, English Church, 268–69; Victoria Thompson, “The Pastoral Contract in Late AngloSaxon England: Priest and Parishioner in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Laud Miscellaneous 482,” in
Pastoral Care in Late Anglo-Saxon England, ed. Francesca Tinti (Woodbridge, UK, 2005), 106–20,
at 118–19.
131
Hamilton, “Rites for Public Penance,” 83–87; Cubitt, “Individual and Collective Sinning,” 57–
58.
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confession and penance in order to complete the process of compensation.132 I have
argued elsewhere that the severe corporal punishments prescribed in Wulfstan’s
royal law codes had a penitential objective, causing offenders enough suffering to
inspire them to reconcile with God before death.133 I propose here that milder secular penalties, such as ﬁnes, served a comparable function: material punishment created an opportunity for the offender to redeem his sins with the church and settle
with God through an act of penance, whether or not the payment itself fulﬁlled this
purpose.
Although Wulfstan did not conﬂate crime and sin in his laws, he did envision a
close connection between these categories. According to his legal philosophy, crime
was a symptom of more serious spiritual corruption; thus, the ultimate goal of secular punishment was to redeem offenders’ sin, even as it kept peace and order in the
secular sphere. Because judges were responsible for issuing sentences that were “for
Gode sy gebeorhlic ⁊ for worulde aberendlic” (justiﬁable before God and bearable
before the world), it was vital that the clergy be involved in earthly justice, to ensure
that spiritual concerns would be addressed correctly.134 Although boundaries between secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions helped preserve the purity and focus
of the clergy, those boundaries needed to be permeable when it came time to assign
and implement penalties, moments at which Christian souls were particularly vulnerable. By having laymen and bishops dispense justice at a common gathering,
spiritual and material penalties could be imposed together, backed by the full legal
power of secular and ecclesiastical authorities. Participation in trials and deliberations, by contrast, was to be limited to the appropriate personnel, depending on the
nature of the case. This approach did not efface the distinction between moral and
material offenses. Neither did it legitimize broad clerical participation in secular
procedure. Wulfstan’s innovation, I propose, was to redeﬁne ecclesiastical involvement in earthly justice as an element of pastoral care.135 It was the responsibility of
the clergy—especially bishops—to ensure that no souls were lost through overly
permissive royal law, inordinately harmful punishments, or unfulﬁlled penitential
sentences. It was also crucial, however, that the clergy keep to their appointed place
and not be distracted by secular affairs that did not further their pastoral mission:
bishops should not “secularibus iudiciis . aut negotiis: curis . uel causis . se . . .
ocupent sed eclesiasticis” (to occupy themselves with administration or pleas in secular judgments or lawsuits—only with ecclesiastical ones).136

132
A comparable process for offenders seeking sanctuary is proposed by Trisha Olson, “Sanctuary
and Penitential Rebirth in the Central Middle Ages,” in Boundaries of the Law: Geography, Gender
and Jurisdiction in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, ed. Anthony Musson (Aldershot, 2005), 38–
52.
133
Maraﬁoti, “Punishing Bodies.”
134
II Cnut 2 (5 III Edgar 1.2).
135
A similar argument is advanced concerning Burchard of Worms by Austin, “Jurisprudence in the
Service of Pastoral Care”; and see also Mary Frances Giandrea, Episcopal Culture in Late Anglo-Saxon
England (Woodbridge, UK, 2007), 169.
136
The full quotation is above, 15 and n. 65. Wulfstan offers regulations for other orders of clergy
(including monks, canons, and priests) elsewhere in his corpus: see, for example, V Æthelred 5–9;
Wulfstan, Canons of Edgar 57–68, ed. Roger Fowler, Wulfstan’s Canons of Edgar, Early English Text
Society, o.s., 266 (London, 1972), 14–17.
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In delineating precise roles for lay and clerical magnates, and in establishing the
limits of secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, Wulfstan’s approach to earthly justice was largely consistent with the stated logic behind the separation of jurisdictions after the Norman Conquest. Like William, Wulfstan sought to institute a judicial structure that would give clergy exclusive authority over Christian souls and
insulate the church from secular concerns. This also seems to have been an objective
behind Æthelred’s pre-Wulfstanian law codes, which removed religious provisions
altogether, presumably with the understanding that cases that touched on church
affairs or spiritual offenses would be governed by ecclesiastical, not secular, procedure. It is signiﬁcant, however, that the competing judicial models that emerged in
the generation after Edgar’s death were each concerned with a detrimental overlap
between ecclesiastical and secular justice. The point of contention was how such
overlap should be addressed. Where Æthelred’s pre-Wulfstanian laws appear to
have moved away from Edgar’s collaborative model by fully separating ecclesiastical and secular justice, Wulfstan sought to improve upon Edgar’s laws by delineating precise jurisdictions for clergy and laymen within a collaborative system.
The problem with Wulfstan’s model, I suggest, was that the divisions he outlined
were too subtle to be practicable on a wide scale. However sound the theory behind
his differentiation of ecclesiastical and secular judicial obligations, it seems unlikely
that lay and religious magnates would keep strictly or consistently to their assigned
roles at mixed assemblies. Yet even if the boundaries were respected in some cases,
these limitations would not necessarily be apparent to outsiders. The precise roles
ﬁlled by secular and ecclesiastical authorities could be obscured by collaborative deliberation, leading observers—from Ælfric to William—to conclude that there was
no substantive difference between these groups or their inﬂuence. Moreover, although William’s mandate for separate jurisdictions suggests that collaborative justice endured through the Conquest, it is unclear how fully this model adhered to
Wulfstan’s prescriptions. Judicial privileges were granted to religious authorities
with increasing frequency as the eleventh century progressed, indicating that bishops and other high-ranking clergymen had a material stake in the administration of
earthly justice.137 While it is conceivable that ecclesiastics delegated their judicial activities to lay administrators, as Wulfstan advocated, it seems probable (in light of
post-Conquest concerns) that at least some members of the clergy were participating in a full range of secular judicial processes. William deemed this approach untenable, and it is tempting to read his initiatives as ﬁrst steps toward later medieval
jurisprudence—especially when viewed in light of twelfth-century conﬂicts over the
jurisdictions of canonical and secular courts in England, or the sharpening division
137
The scope of these privileges (often indicated, from the mid-tenth century, by the formula sac ⁊
soc) is debated: see especially Patrick Wormald, “Lordship and Justice in the Early English Kingdom:
Oswaldslow Revisited,” in Property and Power in the Early Middle Ages, ed. Wendy Davies and Paul
Fouracre (Cambridge, UK, 1995), 114–36; Stephen Baxter, “Lordship and Justice in Late Anglo-Saxon
England: The Judicial Functions of Soke and Commendation Revisited,” in Early Medieval Studies in
Memory of Patrick Wormald, ed. Stephen Baxter, Catherine E. Karkov, Janet L. Nelson, and David
Pelteret (Farnham, UK, 2009), 383–419. For the increased frequency of such grants from the later
tenth century, see Florence E. Harmer, Anglo-Saxon Writs, 2nd ed. (Stamford, 1989), 73–79; George
Molyneaux, The Formation of the English Kingdom in the Tenth Century (Oxford, 2015), 175–77;
and see also Giandrea, Episcopal Culture, 180–86.
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between royal and ecclesiastical power that characterized the era of the Gregorian
reforms.138 It is surely signiﬁcant that Henry II reissued the canons of the 1080
Council of Lillebonne in the 1160s, indicating that William’s initiatives were considered foundational in the twelfth century.139 Nevertheless, despite the rhetoric of innovation in post-Conquest texts, William appears to have revived an earlier model
of English justice by restoring the ecclesiastical-criminal division of Æthelred’s early
reign.140 Even if this development was inspired by Continental episcopal courts
rather than English practice, it ran counter to Wulfstan’s judicial initiatives and
reimposed the legal model he had argued against, whereby “that which before was
common to Christ and the king in earthly punishment” was divided.141 Still, the
need for such a reversal conﬁrms that the judicial model Wulfstan legislated was
more than mere aspiration. Although it may have been implemented imperfectly,
collaborative justice evidently remained sufﬁciently prominent in England that it
drew royal attention some ﬁfty years after Wulfstan’s death.142 In this context, William’s writ should be understood as part of a broader debate concerning the relationship between secular and ecclesiastical justice over the course of the eleventh
century.
138
See, for example, Helmholz, Oxford History of the Laws of England, 1:108–18; Maxey, “Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction,” 360–61; Charles Duggan, “The Becket Dispute and the Crimonious Clerks,”
Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 35 (1962): 1–28.
139
For the 1080 council, see above, n. 6. Henry’s reafﬁrmation of the Lillebonne canons at a 1162
council in Rouen is described by Robert of Torigni; the text is edited by Richard Howlett, Chronicles
of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I, vol. 4, The Chronicle of Robert of Torigni (London,
1889), 212; and see the discussion of this passage by Chaplais, “Henry II’s Reissue,” 629; W. L. Warren, Henry II (Berkeley, 1973), 95–96.
140
Compare Helmholz, Oxford History of the Laws of England, 1:58.
141
Quotation above, 8–9 n. 33. For Continental practice, see Hamilton, “Episcopal Justice”; Hamilton, Practice of Penance, 45–50.
142
Morris, “William I and the Church Courts,” 460–61.
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